Good evening, welcome to the third episode of the series In the Midst of Philosophy.

My name is Stefanos Baziotis.

I am a fourth-year PhD student at the Computer Science Department of the University of Illinois.

Today, in this third episode, the goal of the discussion is to clarify some core notions of Political Science,

which have been misinterpreted in Modernity.

What will guide us today

is the notion of democracy

but also the terminology that revolves around it;

terms such as “society,” “state,” “political system,” etc.

So, in the hope that we will set these
terms on a more sturdy foundation,

we will then try to propose some solutions,

as well as to see how we can handle any challenges

to reach a better democracy [*].

I am using the first plural because thankfully I will not be asked to complete this task on my own.

To help me today—to guide us, I would say,

we have with us Mr. [*] George Contogeorgis.

Good evening Mr. Contogeorgis, thank
very much for being with us today.

Good evening, thank you very much, my pleasure and honor.

You're welcome. [*]

Mr. Contogeorgis has an exceptionally extensive CV, which is why I won't list all of it.

You can find below in the notes and the references [*].

So, indicatevely I will say that he is an ex-Rector of Panteion University,

and Professor Emeritus of Political Science.

Am I right, Mr. Contogeorgi[s]?

Correct.

Perfect.

But the most important thing regarding today's discussion

is that exactly the issue I set, meaning,

the interpretation, or rather, to base central concepts of Political Science on a more sturdy foundation,

and to avoid misinterpretations of Modernity, is basically something that runs through the whole work of

Mr. Contogeorgi[s], which, if I'm not mistaken,
counts more than 50 years, right?

52 with 53 books.

I didn't know that! Nice.

Plus articles.

Right.

I think in the articles, it [i.e., the work] should count in the hundreds there, eh?

C: [They] are...
S: If we also count...

of those, the 13 books are... have been published
in other languages, mainly French.

I'm saying that in the interest, potentially, of some [people]. And about 107-108 articles again in foreign languages.

In several countries.

Nice, nice.

Heavy...

And so, he is the most appropriate person to help us today.

Basically, Mr. Contogeorgis’ work

was the raison d’être for this discussion, and I am very happy that these questions

that were created to me while reading this work,
I hope we will be able to solve them.

My role is that of a clueless person,

though of a non-complaisant clueless person.

Alright, let's get started!

I think that the most important notion in the entirety of your work is the notion of the society.

I don't know if we all understand what a society is...

I will just say that certainly one problem I have found
with this term is that today,

I think it gets conflated with the notions,
or the terms anyway,

“the people” and “the state,” which I think is problematic because these terms have legal grounds. That is,

they are interpreted in a specific way, as far
as I know, by legal practitioners [*].

First of all, I think that since 1975, in the [Greek] Constitution, the concepts they refer to are identical [*].

and it is the set [that includes all] of citizens.

But what is a citizen? It is a person recognized
by a state as its member.

That is, to put simply, the Greek citizens
are those who have a Greek passport.

But this is a problem because if we employ
this definition for the term society,

then we need to take as a premise the
existence  of the notion of the state.

Thus, it seems somewhat problematic.

So,

Mr. Contogeorgis, what would you say is a society? [*]

[This is] what I would say, because I don't agree with what the so-called Science of Modernity says [*].

The [i.e., a] society is a group of individuals which lives in a place, which is politically constituted.

For example, the state territory.

In a sense, it is identical to the notion of “the people”; [only] in a sense, though.

The people is a cultural community, which, however, does not include all members of this community.

For instance, the Greeks of diaspora are not part of the Greek people, so, of the society which,

culturally, refers to the notion of Greekness,

so [they are not part] of the nation
that is within the state.

Similarly, the Greek people does not include the foreigners who live in a country who are not part of the people.

So have to come here to [i.e., we have to consider] closely associated notions in order to understand exactly the fine shades [i.e., differences] that exist.

For example, when we talk about society
and we mean the people

—so, including the citizens, the notion of the citizen—

will we mean what they say in the European,
English, or French literature?

That this [i.e., the society as the people], if you wish, is the “civil society” [he used the English term]

—because in Greek there has been a [linguistic] corruption and it is translated, this term [i.e., “civil society”], as “society [composed] of citizens.”

The civil society is

the interest groups [or lobbies] that are
between the society and politics.

That is, the organized interest groups that try to influence, in some way, the political affairs;

or some other social bodies that exist within a country.

So to have [some] influence. It is not
the society as whole [*].

If we want to view the society in political terms...

Why do I say “the society in political terms?”

Because if we talk generally about the society today,

we mean the sum of the members which
constitute the country, right?

This is exactly where the problem lies: that, in political terms, this sum which doesn't have a [political] status;

they exist, but to have status, it must have [a] will, as each member of a society has.

So, we have to speak in political terms
for a society of the citizens.

That is, we need to add to the notion of society—even if this society is a private body [*],

which concerns itself with its private affairs—the notion of citizenship, the role of [being] a citizen.

The property of being a citizen, however

—if we have the intention of discussing it later—

is not singular.

Today when we talk about a citizen, we
mean the subject [*] of the state.

So, the society is the sum of the members

that belong to a country, who simultaneously constitute,

partly,

the notion of the people of this country; the Greek people, the Italic, the American, etc.

And on the other hand,

we have the notion of the nation.

The notion of the nation is much broader.

For example, [Greek] diaspora belongs to the Greek nation,

which does not belong to the notion
of the people or society of the citizens.

The concept of the nation is a conscience of society that contains a cultural, cohesive reference.

That is, we want and...

Even if we do not agree, or even if we do
not meet with each other,

[we want] to say that we belong to the nation of Greeks,
similarly to how others belong to another nation.

The reason why each of us wants to be called Greek, may contain many different elements.

One because he sets as a top priority the notion of

the [i.e., a] specific religion, someone else
[sets as a top priority] her tradition, [a third yet] where she comes from.

In any case, the notion of the nation is many
[notions combined], but it concentrates

the persons within an area of common interest

which, what does it contain as a basic element,
and it is the first principle

for all the other references? The notion of freedom [!]

That is why the notion of the nation differs
from the notion of the ethnicity.

A big discussion is taking place today
about the continuity of the nation.

There is continuity—continuous continuity—
of the notion of ethnicity.

The ethnicity is the cultural reference
that a part of a society has.

For example, in the period
of the Western Middle Ages,

but also in whole of humanity, apart from the Greek world, what was continuous was the ethnicity.

Meaning, the French, the Germans... constituted—with the language and many other elements—the notion of ethnicity.

But they were not a nation.

The nation exists only from the moment a person
acquires a free existence as an individual.

Why?

Because then the cultural entity in which [this individual] belongs—that community—acquires a political imperative.

That is, I want as a French, [or] as a
Greek, to acquire freedom too.

So, constitution into a territory, which today we call “state”—once called differently—

So, the organization into a state, within the territory, to determine our own affairs [*].

This does not answer the question of who decides
within the state regarding those affairs,

meaning, [the affairs] of the nation,
but this is another issue.

It is, however, the first principle of freedom.

Because states are constituted based on the nation,
so with the claim to become free.

And that is why here there is a great conflict
between nation and nationalism [*].

The nation is the cultural community that wants to be free.

Nationalism is what we saw when the European
nations were initially constituted,

mainly in the 19th century,

which, on the one hand they repressed other ethnicities

domestically—so as not to become nations,
not to assert their independence—

Like, I don't know, the French were [i.e., behaved]
against the Bretons, and many others,

or they are acting expansively against other nations.

For example, today—to see the extent of the confusion—

the assertion and claim of Kurds to acquire a national status, meaning, political independence,

is considered nationalism. While, the policy of
the Turkish state is considered not to be nationalism.

That is, the expansiveness of the Turkish state can be characterized nationalism, but [...] no [*].

The Kurds are nationalists, as well the Greeks who
carried out the revolution of 1821.

Or the previous revolutions.

This confusion is due to the ignorance,
of course, of the fundamental

preconditions of the existence of the human, but the nation is not [i.e., does not imply] nationalism by definition.

In fact, in the name of the nation,
policies of the state are carried out,

which are expansive and
repressive towards other groups,

and they attribute them to the nation.

Nice. So... To avoid introducing too many notions at once,

As far as the society is concerned, could we—simply,
but you can tell if it's accurate—say that it's a set of individuals

who choose to coexist.

To organize themselves as a whole and to coexist.

Where if we have the notion of the conscience of a society—meaning, the cultural cohesion—

[then] they compose a nation.

But, within a country there may be multiple nations.

Yes, I say that because...

Then there are more...

There is one society—that is, if we view it at the level
of the property of [being] a citizen,

or even not being a citizen—as we can have a nation within a country that doesn't have the property of a citizen—

which is part of the society

as a sum of individuals, but which does not
constitute [i.e., fulfill] the other preconditions;

of the people, the nation—but has its own
ethnic reference, etc.

[These] are subtle concepts but we need to know
them in order to understand one another.

I think I understand.

I’m making the distinction precisely because I think that,

in the problems that will concern us in this discussion, the [notion of the] nation may not  be as central

as is [the notion of the] society. That is, the society,

if I understand it correctly, is some
individuals who want to coexist.

As you mentioned, they may have some identity,
some cultural thread that runs through them,

but theoretically this is not necessary.

That is, we could have... Neither is the
physical space necessary, right?

That is, the notion of society could be some individuals,

for example, I don't know... The whole, let's say, of some
teachers, who are part of an Internet society.

Of these wouldn’t have their autonomy.

They would be under the authority of some state.

So, they wouldn’t be independent, like the Greek state, but anyway, not to perplex the matter,

they would be some individuals who would
form a kind of society, right?

Of course.

For example, about 15-20 years ago,

I was discussing with some [people]—from the United States actually—and I was telling them that we can create

a πολιτεία—I was using this term [back] then, and not [the term] “state”—

without [a] territory, which would include... It would have its constitution, i.e., at the level of the Internet,

which would have its Constitution,
it would have its citizens,

it would legislate, it would also develop
other cultural or economic activities.

I will also tell you something that, in the 1980s, I had suggested to the then Greek government:

to create the Greek πολιτεία of diaspora.

Meaning, a—let's call it, in quotes—state

which would not have [any] territory, but would it would have all the political organization that would allow

the members, e.g., from Australia or from the United States and so on, to organize themselves, to have institutions...

And this is not something that is reduced to fantasy.

It is the base on which Greeks lived up
until the liberation.

When, for example, the Greeks of the Austrian Empire...

Anyway, Austria intended to tax them,
and they threatened that

they will leave from there,
they [i.e., the Austrians] wondered

how it could be that they had such a cohesion
and unanimity in their decisions.

And the secret services of Maria Theresa
found that basically

they operated as a state within state. That is,
they had organized their commons,

within which they their own legislation and they co-decided in [a state of] democracy what to do [*].

They applied, frugally of course, the
legislation of the Austrian state,

but they, wherever they could, in their own affairs, they had exactly their own internal πολιτεία.

Yes, nice.

That's what I meant by a...

C: These are societies but with a different content.

Previously, we talked about the normal historical
societies that are organized politically.

Yes, that’s why I wanted to make the distinction;

because I don’t think the problems that will concern us today are limited only to ethnic communities [*].

S: I think that they are relevant to any community.
C: Obviously.

Great.

So, the other term that is used a lot in your work,

and which we hear lot in the news, we come across it while reading, is the term “political system.”

I would say that I understand this term as, quite generally, the way a society organizes itself.

Which usually has something which I would call “charter,”

which today, in the Western world,
we call a “Constitution,”

And this Constitution describes which bodies are established, with what properties, and how they interact.

Also, as Aristotle would say, it is
the way of life of a society.

That is, we might call it: politics of collective bios.

How does that sound?

Or if you may, define what a political system is.

The political system is the organization; the institutional organization of a state territory.

Today, for example, this institutional organization is described in the Constitutions,

as you correctly pointed out.

Therefore, this institutional organization contains, on the one hand, the political system in its narrow sense;

government, parliament, etc.

It then contains justice, it contains the so-called public administration and the state organizations.

It contains the forces [for maintaining]
public order [i.e., law enforcement],

and the forces for the protection
of the country [i.e., the military].

This is not all part of the political system, in the way the political system is considered today.

The political system in the narrow sense

is the political organization of the state.

Why am I saying “the political organization of the state?”

Because all of these, according to the
contemporary, and nondistinguishing,

unanimous political theory and philosophy,

belong to the state.

As a naturally special illegal act [*].

That is, no one [attempts to conceive] removing the political system, in the narrow sense—

the justice, the public administration, the army, the police—from the state and to hand them over to someone else.

It is from its nature, they tell us.

This has a consequence.

Not distinguishing the dynamics of things.

Meaning, they tell us that this is how we were born [i.e., this is how the world into which we were born was],

this has been history as a whole,
and this is how we will proceed.

Thus, there is, indisputably, a state—which now is no longer the state of the absolute monarch, Louis'

or Victoria's, but it is a legal entity,
like the public limited companies,

which does not only have the territory to rule, but also the whole of the institutions, so, of the organization.

What does this mean?

That it is the so-called state, so, that entity which
owns (!) the legal entity of the state,

and especially the top institution—the
president or the prime minister—

which in practice decides for the country's fate.

That is, what we want, they tell us, is
historically given [i.e., determined],

and does not change; it is decided only by the one
[μόνος -> mon-archy] or the few [ὀλίγοι -> olig-archy].

As a consequence, we may express desires, but it depends on them [i.e., the one or the few rulers] whether they [ditto] will adopt them [i.e., the desires] or not.

Or to confront us, but the society is a private partner [*], it is not part of the state, of the political system.

There is a clear dichotomy between the state as an organizational body of the society,

which has the responsibility of the society,

[and] it [i.e., the state] deliberates under
which terms [the society] will live,

what it [i.e., the society] will eat,
how it will sleep, etc.

Not in its private life but,

that which it [i.e., the state] will give it [i.e., the society] in order to have prosperity,
or lack thereof, and freedom,

and the society concerns itself with its own affairs, meaning, each individual member of the society,

is concerned with her private life.

Okay, let me try to rephrase it, maybe... I think
it was completely understandable.

Let me just give an example, trying to
make it more tangible,

and tell me if I'm wrong.

That is, I will offer an analogy and you can
tell me if it is a good analogy or not.

I'm thinking of it as follows: let's assume we have a gym.

Like any other common business.

This business will have a charter, which in
our analogy is the Constitution.

This charter describes what we would call institutions.

For example, it describes the administration.

There are specific bodies.

It also describes the properties of different
individuals within the administration:

the director, what it means to be a member, etc.

It describes obligations, rights, and also
the ways all these bodies interact.

S: Does the analogy sound ok up to here?
C: Yes, yes, of course.

Nice.

Moreover, this charter describes, for example,
what is a member of the gym.

S: This is also an institution, individual though...
C: Citizen...

S: I'm sorry?
C: The citizen.

Yes, in our analogy the member of the
gym corresponds to the citizen.

This is an individual, who, as an
individual institution, also has

a specific role, specific properties; for example, it is the person who has been through a process of registration, etc.

This person specific rights—for example, to
come to the gym three times a week—

and specific obligations—for example, to take a
shower before working out, ok.

Many times in your work you say: “the society
does not constitute an institution.”

In this analogy,

let's consider the set that includes all the
members of the gym,

which obviously exists through induction.

Let's now assume that this set of members
gathered up into an assembly,

wrote down some requests,

and went to the administration of the gym and
said: “you know, we want these.”

I think that what you describe is that administration
could say: “and why should I care?”

It is not described anywhere in the charter something that is called “the set of all gym members.”

The charter says there is an administration, it (!) decides.

There are also individual members.

There are some ways in these two interact.

For example, the members of a gym need
to deposit a paid subscription.

But there is no notion of the set of
all members, as a whole.

Much less is there any mention of how these two [i.e., the administration and this whole] interact.

Is this a good analogy?

Absolutely.

That is, they have the obligation to pay their subscription—just like the citizen pays the tax.

But they don't the right to ask the director of
the gym what he did with the money—

or the tax [*], for the citizen [i.e., similarly the citizen
does't have the right to ask the president
what he did with the tax money].

And [the citizen] doesn't have any
legal standing law to ask it.

It is an exclusive right of the director.

It is [the director's] exclusive right regarding who to fire, or not fire, among the employees,

and the only right that remains to the gym practitioner
is, if she doesn't like it, to leave.

To go to a different one.

This is happened during the Greek [financial] crisis [after 2010], when 1.5 million, and counting, Greeks left abroad.

The same thing is happening with the universities.

Why don't we have good universities?

Aren't we able to create any? No.

They are structured so as to produce work for a
different purpose than the one they exist for.

Therefore, they tell you: if you don't like this,
you can't but go to another university abroad.

Thus, all institutions reproduce the same logic

from the top, which is the political
system of the state, to the bottom.

You will tell me [i.e., object] that some humans
—friends, acquaintances—

may assemble and build a gym, in which
they will make decisions all together.

But this is not within the current limits of the law,

and of course, [such a scheme] does exist in
minds the minds of humans,

but it is absolutely forbidden, because the Constitution does not allow it at the level of the political system.

This is the the notion of the “private society”
[or society as a private partner].

First of all [*], here [i.e., in this case], because it involves large numbers,

they [i.e., the citizens that form the society] don't have the capability to form will [i.e., volonté générale].

The citizen today, as [part of a] collectivity,

is considered to be, as is said in legalese:
under judicial interdiction [*].

That is, he is considered incapable
of deciding [on his own],

he is considered incapable of thinking, and incapable of comprehending what his [best] interest is.

And that is why all of these [i.e., all these responsibilities] are taken by someone

—who is the legal entity of the state, so, those who disguise themselves as the will of the state—

to manage them supposedly on behalf of society.

Here, we're entering another question:

what is the nature of the political system? Which,
if you ask me, we will discuss it.

We will get to that.

But to illuminate the landscape, which I think was completely understandable.

But to be sure that everyone understands
the correspondence with the analogy.

In our analogy, the [gym] administration is the state.

And many times you talk about extra-
institutional instruments...

Like you said, some may assemble,
discuss, etc., but this is

not something institutional. So to connect
this with the analogy again, one may ask:

The fact that the members of the gym
[as a collective, not individually]

are not an institution, they are not put
in writing in the charter,

does that mean that they cannot exert pressure,
that they cannot bring about changes?

They can. Here's what I would say,
and correct me if I am wrong.

For example, I imagine that if these
members actually come together,

and write down some requests, the gym will probably say:
okay, I'll accept, let's say, two of them.

It's just that: whether this will happen is totally up to whom is an institution; meaning, the administration.

In other words, according to the charter,

it is only up to the administration if, and how,
the interaction will take place between them.

That is, whether the administration will accept
all ten of them? Eight of them? None?

Or how exactly the discussions will happen [i.e., the terms], and how the operation will proceed.

That's why even today, one may say that we can
get out on the street and protest

—just like the gym members can protest—but,

the Constitution says nowhere that the state is
obligated to even enter any discussions.

Right?

Exactly.

Look, there are the extra-institutional
interventions; for example, I protest.

But we know that the protests come out of the urge of some party, or some institutional “reality“

—a union [for example]—

But where

the will—meaning, that request which they will submit to politics—is not the society's [will].

It is that of the institution—for example, that [request] of the opposition party, or that of the union—

which it [i.e., the party or the union] gives
shape to, and calls onto

the society, or the members of the society,
to accede in order to support the request.

In practice, then, to support

the presence in the communication [i.e., relations] of
those who are in charge of things

in a regime of opposition [i.e., when one is an opposition party] or of asserting [the power of the state].

We therefore have

the distinction—at least the on I make in my work—between political process and political dynamics.

Political process is whatever is followed within the institutions to make a decision and then apply/enforce it.

Political dynamics is the extra-institutional intervention, either by institutional intermediaries,

—unions, pressure groups, etc.—or even
non-institutional [intermediaries],

which get out on the streets, or go on strike, or take other various actions to exert pressure.

This is the political dynamics,

meaning, the extra-institutional political intervention in things with the aim of influencing.

Yes.

There will be a bit of a back-and-forth, but I
think it is important to clarify this.

In general, when we talk about “an institution,”

we are referring to something that is recognized by a charter—a Constitution, for

example, in this case—

which, if I understand correctly,

has specific properties that are written down in that charter/Constitution, a specific role,

specific obligations, specific rights, and specific ways of interacting with the rest of the institutions.

And also, specific ways that it is supposed
to operate. For example,

the parliament is an institution;

the Constitution, to some degree, specifies how the Members of Parliament should confer with one another, etc.

Am I right?

Right, but be careful.

Take, for example, mass media.

[Take for example] a TV or radio company;

let's not go further, to the new technologies.

It is a recognized institution that has internal administration, cohesion, the administration decides

which journalist to hire, etc.

But this institution,

at the level of a political system, does
not work as an institution

but essentially has two other properties/capacities:

(1) [that of a] pressure group, and at the same time,

(2) [it has] a role that turns the citizen into a
consumer of the political product.

In other words, [it] takes the raw
material, which is politics,

it processes it according to its own
view/opinion, will, or interest,

and then it [i.e., mass media] sells it to society.

That is, instead of the society being
a producer of politics,

and thus, [a producer] of political outcomes,

it [i.e., the society] becomes a consumer, [who consumes] not directly from that who produces the politics

—i.e., the politician—

but through the mediation of the mass medium.

That is why I have said that we should distinguish the ownership of the [mass] medium.

Ιt may be [managed by] a contractor who receives contracts because she exhanges... she decides

which politician will appear to express
his opinion, so that people see him,

or, everything else which we know how they become an object of management [i.e., manipulation],

but the management of politics should not belong to the director/manager and the rest—the journalists—

but there should be

constitutional map of the mass media

which will decide how the development of the political process will take place,

where it is an object of news.

How it will get transferred and what,
and who will represent.

Neither the party nor the director of medium.

This is why, since 1989,

I had proposed and had literally imposed

the first authority

—which is an independent authority—

which was the [Greek] National Council for Radio and Television, which, however, was not structured in the way

that it should have been in order to determine the terms

of the handling of politics, so that the citizen

does not become a consumer, that is, a customer

of the medium that mediates and manipulates

the politician who is accredited to practice
the policies of the state.

Yes, think it's understandable.

To be clear when it comes to terminology, you said that a mass medium is an institution.

If I understand this correctly, this means that it has its own charter, specific functions/operations, etc.

But it is not an institution of the political system.

Of course not.

Right.

So, what you described is a process in which this extra-institutional instrument

—extra-institutional in the sense that it is not part of the political system, it is not recognized by the Constitution—

meets with institutions of the political system
—for example, a political party—

for various reasons...

As you said, for example, to make the citizen a consumer,

or because a political party wants to “metabolize” throughout the society

—well, let's not call it “information”; anyway, its policies/politics/opinions—

in a specific way.

But this is an extra-institutional meeting; the mass
medium is not an institution.

And this is why there are no checks/restrictions, or

any provision by the Constitution, regarding how, what you said, will happen/take place.

That is, how certain policies will be communicated. Right?

You know very well that in the US one of these media censored the President of the United States.

It does not matter who the President
was and which the medium is.

What matters is that it [i.e., the medium] deemed [appropriate], and in fact,

it had the authority which the political
authority assigned to it,

to also perform this function.

I will tell you this with an example.

Consider an enterprise that produces fabrics.

It purchases, and pays for, the raw material,
which is the cotton, for example.

And it processes it, or it buys it from
that who processes it,

it [i.e., the company] transforms it into a fabric, and calls onto the consumer to buy it.

It offers the customer more options.

Here, it is not conceivable that a public good, such as the political function of a society,

for this company [i.e., the mass medium] to operate like a fabric company, verticalized.

So, [the mass medium] lays hold of the politics for free, transforms it according to its will, and sells it to us,

thereby transforming us from subjects
[of the state] to consumers.

Nice. Let's go, if you'd also like to, to
the big chapter of freedom.

If you allow me, before we go to freedom,
because it is relevant,

perhaps we should make a distinction between
the political system and the πολιτεία.

Please!

Yes, yes.

The notion of the πολιτεία that today in Greek

is identical to the city, to the urban center,

as well the πολις which was the equivalent of today's nation-state, the notion of

the πολιτεία is not the political system.

It is the whole of economic, social and political system.

So how the society is organized at
the level of everyday life,

in its economic system, and in the political system.

The political system is the top dimension

because, as we will see [when we discuss] freedom, it [i.e., the political freedom] is that which concentrates all the other freedoms.

So, in this way, we can get into the notion
of freedom more comfortably.

Tell me.

I think that someone who has been listening to us until now

and is thinking: “Nice, I agree with all these.”

And I think that the clearest conclusion is
that the society is not an institution;

this is where we have focused in one or the other way.

Now I'm guessing that someone will ask:
“okay, and why is this a problem?”

I think we would say that this is a problem

because the society is not free.

If we agree in this general maxim, then

let's analyze it slowly with regards to: what is freedom?

How would we express it in general?

If you address an American, and you tell her:
you know, you're not free.

She will be suprised.

Of course, you will elucidate that she is
free [but] only in certain ways

that are related to her private life, but
otherwise, she is not free.

Why is that?

Because she has integrated in her mind,
and therefore in her values,

only one aspect of freedom,

and not the entire notion of freedom.

This is true not only for an American citizen
you will meet on the street.

Talk, if you want, to a famous, in terms of
publicity, American professor.

John Rawls [for example]; who is among the most known.

The great, yes.

If you tell him “but, you're teaching us the
non-freedom,” he will be surprised.

Because he knows only one region of freedom; he himself.

And he confuses, as we will see, the notion of
“freedom” with the notion of “right.”

When it comes to our personal life,

he defines freedom indeed in the
way that we should define it,

and in which it has been defined since it was discovered.

That is, as autonomy. As our ability to be self-determined.

To determine myself my affairs, and not someone else.

[It is when] no one else is able to dictate to me.

That is why freedom is against authority.

Which is heteronomy.

Exactly. Wherever there is authority,
someone else decides on our behalf.

This does not define the notion of anarchy,

but it is the raw material to define
freedom in various fields,

i.e., in the the levels at which the life
of humans is developed.

Excuse me, I'd like to interject something related
to what you said about anarchy.

I want to ask you if you agree—because it touched me—with something that Castoriades said.

That autonomy is not the uncontrolled action;
meaning, it's not that I do whatever I want.

Autonomy means that I create the law, and then obey it [*].

Which again, I don't know if you agree, was at least one of the breakthroughs of Ancient Greece.

They were the first to say: for us to respect the law, it doesn't need to originate in someone else, e.g., God.

We have the self-respect both to create
our laws and to obey them [*].

Do you agree with that?

Of course, but it matters who creates the law,
and what the law contains.

Because every political system, every
πολιτεία, has different laws.

So we have to see what freedom is, and whether and how freedom is substantiated—which is the purpose of the human—

through the institutions. That is, the political system(s).

To the extent that today the dominant perception is

that freedom is only one, and concerns our
private life, it means that space is left

so that in all other aspects

of our social life—where we sign contracts,

such as e.g., in the labor market, the economy, or politics—in those aspects there is no freedom.

That is why, when reading e.g., John Rawls, since we mentioned the name—all together, not just him—
you will find out

On the one hand, he defines individual freedom as autonomy.

On the other hand, he defines socioeconomic
and political freedom as a right.

For example, he believes that today we have political freedom. Why? Because we can protest.

While this is a right; and wherever the rights
propsper, there is no freedom.

We do not protest against ourselves or our
neighbors for our individual freedom.

We protest against those who exercise
power or authority over us.

Aristotle communicates to us, with a small phrase,
the dogma—if you want—of democracy.

The/to “μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ μηθενός.”

The/to “μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ μηθενός” declares
not the anarchy but the democracy.

That is why freedom has three levels,
at least the way I define it.

[The first level] is the individual freedom,
which is concerned with

our private life.

[The second level] is the social freedom—which includes the economy—and is concerned with

our life, where—in the microcosm of the country in which we live—we enter into contracts.

And [the third level is] the political freedom,

which is concerned with the overall political system.

So, who has the responsibility of our life.

Let me give an example.

If we search for a job, in a company.

They will offer us a contract which will list the
[terms and] conditions:

how many hours we will work,
what obligations we will have, [etc.]

And who sets them? [i.e., the terms and conditions]

[The person] who has the company;

in exchange for [monetary] compensation.

We agree, then—and we think—

that at that moment we reached a good
agreement [i.e., got a good deal].

To receive a good salary and have good
work [i.e., employment] terms.

But what does this mean? It conceals an
assignment/cession of freedom.

Because in these 8 hours, or however many hours
of work, someone else decides for us [*].

We just give up from this principle [of freedom]

on our own... No third-party coerces us, as it
used to be the case in feudalism.

But, what does this mean?

That we stop being free?

We do.

You know, here there's a big issue,

with which I have been confronted many times.

They say [/claim]: since it happens with our will [i.e., consent], we continue to be free.

In other words, if you and I agree that I
become your slave for a year,

it means that, although I will respect the agreement and I will behave as a slave, I will be free because I can denounce it.

While I'm experiencing/living slavery, I am a slave.

And, I can stop being a slave when I quit the agreement.

In other words, if I sign an employment contract,

—which is a contract of dependent employment; it is a contract of assignment/cession of freedom—

then, I will regain my freedom if I leave.

But because I will not have any income to live/subsist,

I will search for another job [i.e., employment contract].

So, I will again resign from my freedom.

In political life—so, the political freedom—is considered...

You have [probably] heard about the Social Contract.

Nobody signs a contract. The politicians
make the Constitutions on their own.

But what does this mean?

That we, and it's true, agree/consent.

I don't know if you have awareness of
what happened in Iceland.

Where, through a dispute, the citizens
decided to make a Constitution.

C: Well, they made...
S: I have it in... You have mentioned many things that I have in my notes.

C: They created a Constitution in the way that a regime loyalist constitutionalist would create it.

Because in the minds of persons, the notion
of freedom is not included.

[What is] is include is the notion of [individual] rights.

That is, around [i.e., in] the contract that we have signed

with a company for our employment,
there are some provisions.

So that it can't insult us,

to send us do the dishes at home, to deprive us of our salary, or to reduce it, depending on the case.

That is, some rights are enforced/impose
that protect in the least our individuality.

But we don't become free with the rights.

There are many issues that are contained in this logic [i.e., mentality], one of which is

also the view that the freedom of one stops
where the freedom of the other begins.

In no way.

Wait a minute.

S: I would like to take them one by one, if you want.
C: However you want.

S: I have exactly that as a question, if you want.
C: Sure, of course.

Great. First, do we agree that freedom, on all levels...

First of all, when you talk about individual freedom, it is concerned with each individual person.

Our personal life, our private life, within the society.

Yes, social freedom is concerned with relations/relationships between individuals.

But be careful, it concerned with contracts.

A necessary clarification.

Yes.

[It's not concerned with] all contracts...

For example, if we to the doctor for our illness,

we do not enter a dependence relationship [i.e., a relationship of subordination].

If we go to the engineer to build our house,

we do not enter a dependence relationship [i.e., again, a relationship of subordination].

It is a gentleman's agreement that has to
do with a specific problem,

which, however, we address without dependence,

without the other [individual] imposing his/her regime.

We are talking about [i.e., social freedom is concerned with] the cases where there is assignment of autonomy.

Those contracts.

That is where the issue of social freedom comes up.

Nice.

I liked this example a lot.

And we'd say that political freedom is related to the collective organization of society.

Exactly.

Do you know what political freedom means, simply put?

Who decides for the fate of a whole country.

Nice.

The one, the few, or the many/everyone ? [*]

Now, do you agree with the following:

all these levels of freedom have as a common principle the notion of autonomy. That doesn't change, right?

No, this is what freedom is.

To decide myself for my fate, in the field that I want.

Which I believe exists, for me.

Great.

Perfect.

Let's move on to something more fundamental, which is a question with which I've come across many times here.

Who cares about freedom?

Which sounds provocative, but let's take
Singapore as a specific example.

Because it is relatively know that it's been a while since Singapore renounced liberalism.

There is even this book which I have
here called Liberalism Disavowed.

And just the title indicates the problem.

The issue, however, is that Singapore is not a dictatorship.

They have elections. And especially in the last elections, no one can doubt the outcome; e.g., that it was rigged.

They have been choosing the same
party for the last 50 years.

Without having many freedoms supposedly
found in the Western world.

And I think that someone...

Actually, I don't simply think so...

Singaporean citizens themselves tell me that the reason for this is that the people enjoy various material commodities.

Meaning, they have cars, money, etc.

Thus, in this case, underneath the question
of “who cares about freedom,”

the real question is: perhaps freedom

is not an end in itself.

Perhaps on its own it has no value.

It is just a means for other things we
actually care about. For example,

to have a house to live, food to eat,

to have the opportunity to engage in romantic relationships.

I don't know, whatever each one of us cares about.

However, maybe these are our goals, and
freedom is just a means to attain them.

I'm asking this because one could interpret, or explain, the phenomenon of Singapore as:

Since there is a political system that provides all these,

they don't care about freedom.

So, here I think we've stumbled upon a deep issue.

What is your answer? Is freedom an end
in itself, or is it just a means?

I will set [i.e., address] this with a question.

If the current government, which
pushes/circulates this idea,

says that elections stop, and I [i.e., the government]
will remain in power forever,

what will the citizens of Singapore do? Will they agree?

If it decides that [starting] at 8 pm, everyone
will stay in their homes [i.e., a curfew],

and they won't have the right of moving outside?

What will they do [i.e., the Singaporean citizens] ?

It is easy for someone to say:

I literally stuff a society with prosperity,

and material goods in their private lives,

but he leaves out [i.e., ignores] the essence;

that which has been established as obvious.

It is revealed whether it is obvious and secondary
—who cares about it—

when you take it away.

That's why I gave these two examples.

So it is a classic, liberal fact,

which has profited from the conjuncture,

and plays a role which helps tremendously

a society which is far away—very far away—

from that which constitutes the notion of anthropocentrism [*], of societies with freedom, and mainly,

the knowledge of how things evolve.

You know, to give an example that concerns
one [i.e., a single individual].

Each of us knows how a newborn evolves after it is born

If someone, who is 60-70-80 [years old], shows us

a picture of the time when she was born, we
will say that she bears no resemblance.

But the changes that took place are Ovidian [*],

they are very big,

but concern her in her evolution.

The same is true about societies.

This has to do with the science of today which is
not a science, it is an ideology.

Societies have their own biology.

Let's not forget that Asian societies,

arrived at this elementary individual freedom
—meaning, anthropocentrism—

from that which they were before—they were mainly slave-owning societies—

just in the 20th century.

So what takes precedence—we're seeing it, for example, in China; what takes precendence in China?

To have elections?

No.

To protest?

No.

What takes precedence is to raise their income
and to have [good] working conditions.

What was happening

—not go too far [back]—

in the first half of the 20th century in Europe?

When they gave the vote to the Germans [i.e., when Germans were asked to vote] in the eve of WWI, they elected Hitler.

There were not interested in politics; not even as a right.

They were interested in strengthening
two elements that Nazism included:

(1) the social [element]—meaning, the strengthening of the elementary individual freedom in terms of prosperity,

and the second element: (2) the ethnic/national—

the cultural cohesion of the country.

The same happened in all western countries.

It's just that the circumstances seem very distant, but [these events] occurred in the 19th and 20th century.

So you realize that what is happening at the moment,

mainly in the Asian countries,

is not anything different from what happened in Europe.

I had the opportunity, you know,
I think 30+ years ago.

Through the initiative of a large Japanese scientific union

a study had started—which I think [included]
18 countries, Asian and Western—

on cultural values and freedom, politicization, etc.

And I had been assigned Greece.

Polls/surveys were conducted, there were answers—we were not making things up—in all these countries.

Let me inform you, then, that the distance
between Asian countries,

on the issue[s] of freedom and political participation,
and the Western countries was chaotic.

And the distance between all of them and the
Greek case was equally chaotic.

I think that this study is on my website in
English, you can read it.

Great. If we manage to find it, it will be
in the notes and references [*].

I think yes. [It's called] “the Political
Culture in Greece.”

Why am I mentioning this?

That these societies

dream of the survival.

That is, the improvement of the terms [i.e., conditions], mainly the material terms, of their life.

They have not moved past that.

The Cosmosystemic Gnoseology—to refer to my
own working hypothesis—reveals what?

That societies,

and specifically the society in [a state of] freedom,
have an evolutionary biology [*].

Today, the most [pressing issue] is the material part, and elementary rights apart from individual freedom.

But gradually, they are evolving.

And when you ask me about the πολιτεῖες and how the relationship of social actors evolves,

I will be able to explain to you

how freedom develops.

Today we live in the dogma, if you will, of
the Political Theory of the West,

[which is still] in the 18th century era.
That is, in the era of

Benjamin Constant, a Frenchman, who claimed that
individual freedom is superior to political freedom [*].

First of all, he did not know what political freedom is.

But, he wanted to degrade democracy against

the πολίτευμα that he circulated [i.e., supported],
which was elective monarchy.

However, no region [i.e., level] of freedom is
contradictory to any other, and incompatible.

That is, obtaining political freedom does not mean that we will annul our individual existence.

On the contrary, [freedom] is cumulative.

And in fact the trajectory is ascending.

We first go to [i.e., obtain] our individual
liberation; [escaping] serfdom.

Then we move to social and political [freedom].

That is, to expand the field, and where we decide only about affairs of our personal life, to decide about the rest.

Why this?

Why decide for the fate of our country,
and so our collective life?

Well, to put it simply:

Because if someone else decides, that
affects our personal life.

Whereas if we get to decide, the
element of sovereignty is absent.

Because sovereignty in politics has us as
the subject of sovereignty.

While if we set as our goal the πολιτεία—i.e., the universal freedom; individual, social, and political—

then we won't wait from [i.e., depend on]
the Prime Minister of Singapore

to decide if we will have a car, [or] what financial earnings we'll have; we will decide for ourselves.

Thus, we will

have a different dimension of existence and relationship between the economy and society.

In which the society will be [more influential]
than the economy.

Great.

I certainly took away two key points you raised.

The first is about the evolution of societies.

That is, I think that your response was, partly, that Singapore is undergoing a process of evolution.

At some point it will reach...

Of premature evolution, where in its values there are only: individual freedom, and certain rights.

Nice.

Maybe this is the West...  Perhaps Singapore
has not even reached this point yet.

Nevertheless, what you seem be saying is that

at some point, Singapore will desire what
the western world desires today.

And in a similar manner, the western world will reach a stage at which it will demand more things, such as

social freedom, etc.

China as well.

In China, no one without suffrage revolts, so that they can elect the president and the rest of [politicians] in China.

In Europe, if we abolish the right to elect our president or our prime minister, we will revolt, right?

Yes.

Here is the difference in the evolutionary stage.

I have a provocative question, but I think
it is very interesting.

I will pose it.

I will return to the dilemma of whether it is an end in itself or only a means.

Because I think that, at least partly, your
answer rests on the following.

When there is a monarch, that is a human being.

And as a human being he/she is vulnerable, he/she may have prejudices, weaknesses, etc.

So a question that comes up is:

If there were what I call

—well, I'm sure someone else has used the term, but anyway, just to give a name to the concept—

“algorithmocracy,” described as follows.

Today, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has developed enough that the following is no longer a sci-fi scenario:

to have an AI—maybe not in 20 years, maybe
not in 50 years, but let's say in 100 years—

which will be superintelligent.

What do I mean by that?

I mean more intelligent than any human to have ever lived.

The question is then:

Could we several of those AI agents form a [political] state

which, because of their superintelligence,
they will be very rational. But more importantly,

unlike any human,

who could, e.g., take advantage of
politics for personal gains,

an AI could be incorruptible and impartial.

Here I should point out, so that they don't massacre me in the comments, that

such a future does not seem to be close at this moment.

Right now, no one has come up with the solution of how we can develop unbiased AI.

In fact, AI, to a large degree, started developing in
image and likeness of the human.

So, many persons today like

Ms. [*] Federica Frabbetti who appeared in the previous episode in the previous episode, say [this is not a quote]:

In image and likeness of the human? But humans are full of prejudices, (ideological) obsessions,

they go after their self-interest, etc. Is this
what we're envisioning?

So, certainly, to a great extent, my question
rests on a hypothetical scenario.

But to summarize:

if we had a superintelligent, incorruptible,
rational AI, maybe that

could get us more efficiently to these goods that most persons may care about, than what we achieve ourselves.

Artificial Intelligence, and technology in general,

will always be an aid to the human.

Let's see how it is developing today.

If someone wants to find some files, she doesn't
have to go to the dirty library rooms.

She finds them immediately and translates
them into the language she wants.

It makes human activities much easier,
but there is a difference.

It cannot transfer that which is the essence of the human, to that which will be constructed [i.e., to the artificial]

Many—especially big oligarchs of our time—have dreamt of

the transhuman [*], who will be the [result of the] intervention to the human brain, to their DNA.

We can already reassure them

that their dreams which conclude that whatever is left from the human presence, from the economy,

we will turn them into zombies, to which we will give a small sum of money and they will be happy;

[We can reassure them] that that won't happen.

Why?

Because the human is a living being,

which has a psyche, feelings,

values, a cognitive—and in fact, formative—ability which,

the more technology develops, the more [techology] will liberate [the human] from the struggles of survival,

and will transfer him to another sphere where

his endless—meaning, without an end [or fīnis]—
[i.e., infinite] intelligence

will bring him into absolute contact with the
endless [i.e., infinite] wisdom of nature.

So, it will raise her to a level that will remove her from ζῆν, and will transfer her to εὐ ζῆν, in a state of freedom.

And in fact, [it will transfer her] to that
direct relationship between

the absolute intelligence she has, and the
absolute wisdom that nature contains.

She will be harmonized with nature, and this is exactly
an element that technology promises on every level.

For example, it will relieve the human from work,
and it will lead [them] to σχόλη.

Therefore, it will allow them to develop cognitive abilities at the level of life quality, culture, and knowledge

which will create things that will, however,
be of benefit to him.

But most importantly, it will turn
societies into the dominant reality.

That is, in the relationship between society and economy, rather than the economic oligarchs dominating,

it will be the society which will prevail.

I like this position and I agree with you...

History teaches this.

History teaches this. I have analyzed this,

I have predicted... I don’t say that out of vanity,

but because it has been on the record [in his books]

since 1975:

how we will be led to: (a) the transition of labor from a relationship of public law to a commodity, but also

(b) to the liberation from dependent work towards contributing work, and simultaneously

(c) to the liberation from labor itself.

That is, to our exit from the economic labor.

I really like this statement.

Some quick notes...

It has happened [i.e., been recorded] in history.

Yes, and we find something related to cite in the references, I will do it.

Some things I'd like to...

The Athenian democracy in the classical era.

I have it demonstrated precisely in my work.
The notion of σχόλη.

I have developed it in [the book] “Democracy as Freedom”—among others—which you have there. [*]

We will get to that.

Mr. Contogeorgis referred to this book.

A core text for the discussion we're having today.

I would like to note two things.

First, regarding the topics of humanism and transhumanism,

there is a Greek scholar who, in my humble opinion, is one of the leaders of this philosophical thought.

He is a humanist.

I'm talking about Theofanis Tasis.

I recommend his work to anyone interested in the topic.

Second, I would like to briefly mention
cite Aristotle, who said:

“καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὑπηρέτης. εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν

ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον ...  οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον ...”

Anyway [*], Aristotle is basically saying that: if there was a tool that could work on its own,

or predict/understand on its own,
then we would not need any slaves.

It's interesting that this thought was stated so far back, on how he envisioned the machine.

This is the argument for the necessity of slavery [*],

in order to ensure the democracy
with [enough time for the citizens for] σχόλη.

Because slavery, which essentially is
for-sale or contractual labor;

it is not the slavery we know of, that Americans [experienced] with the colonies, etc.

Slavery [in Athens] was the human machine whose
equivalent today is found in technology.

It led to the rejection of the labor of the citizen. And this is what Aristotle wanted to say [i.e., meant].

That said, [let me] make a parenthesis [i.e., a side note].

He predicted the [present], but he did not predict the end of slavery in the Greek world,

which [i.e., the end of slavery] came gradually

[starting] from the Alexandrian
era and was completed in Byzantium,

with the transformation of the economic system
to [a system of] associations [*].

That is, through the application of democratic principle, not only to the political system,

but also to the economic system.

There was no relationship of dependent labor.

The employee contributed to the
ἑταιρεία [i.e., association] itself.

Whether there was any capital contribution or not.

That's also part of my questions.

Before we turn to that, I think this is the right time to finish the discussion of freedom.

Let's go to what I label “freedom and coexistence.”

Here, I should give credit where credit is due. In one of your talks, which unfortunately I cannot recall,

someone asked you a great question.

He asked: “Let's assume we have social freedom, which, as you said, presupposes individual freedom.”

Now, say that we are neighbors; we’re living
in adjacent houses.

And I choose to play music extremely loudly.

Obviously, this will make you unhappy.
On the other hand, we could say

that nobody can tell me not to play music loudly,
since I have my individual freedom.

Of course, I just presented a naive version of
how one can interpret social freedom.

I won't challenge it myself, I'll ask you:
how do you reply to this dilemma?

Look, this is part of the weaknesses of The Science of Modernity to understand the phenomena.

One person's freedom does not end where another's begins.

The freedom of each person is absolute.

[One person’s freedom] stops where
the other person’s force begins,

his/her imposition, his/her denial of the
free person we are talking about.

Let me give an example that I have mentioned many times,
but the same holds in all cases.

If we are two persons living in adjacent houses,
and we want to listen to music,

we can listen to music freely and easily all day.

If I, one of the neighbors, decide to open the windows,

to use a loudspeaker,

so, to listen to music similarly to how some
do it in their cars, at maximum volume,

then, I'm not exercising [my] freedom, I'm using violence against the other person; his ears.

So, my freedom does not end where another’s starts, but where someone else deprives me of my freedom.

And this applies to all levels.

Why don't they understand it?

Quite simply because persons know
only their individual freedom.

and then the rights begin.

The right exists where there is no freedom.

And if freedom is extended, it stops... For example, in politics, if it is us who decide,

we do not need to protest, to have the right to protest, because it gets absorbed, it is rendered useless.

You referred earlier, to a young and remarkable
thinker and scholar, Theofanis Tasis.

I would tell you that we currently have
several remarkable Greek [thinkers]

who someone should gather up in
an environment of creation.

And it is a blessing [*] that they are Greek.

For instance, I would include, and
I would place them together;

as far as I know, they have a common lineage:

they were both Castoriadians [i.e., they
both did research on Castoriades], but

who left Castoriades in the past [i.e., moved on].

My guess is you will mention Sotiris Amarantos? [*]

Exactly.

If we put these two together, they would
[do] exceptional work.

Each from his own starting point. But there are more.

I am saying, then, that there [are remarkable persons], but these persons are outside the system [*].

They do not accept them.

And this shows exactly the insecurity of the system.

That is... You know, I have said it many times:
if one consults history,

[she will find that] novelty is never produced inside institutions of the regime.

The university, primarily in the field of social sciences, never produces novelty.

It reproduces the past and defends it with aggressive terms;

Talibanic.

That's why those who should be inside are outside.

And if they make it into [the university]—by mistake, because they did not notice them [*]—they will isolate them.

This applies to all universities.

We should not think that it only
applies to Greek universities.

It applies to all universities around the world.

Unfortunately, and at this point I want to mention...

I do not want to open this long discussion, but since you mentioned it, I have here a book by Panajotis Kondylis.

I consider him one of the greatest thinkers...

He never got into Greek academia.

Yes, exactly. He had submitted an
application which got rejected.

Anyway, that’s all I wanted to say. He was
a great and magnificent thinker, who

regardless of whether he entered academia or not,
we do not know him in Greece.

I will admit how I learned about him.

I came across this book title randomly,
as I was looking for some Greek books,

The Decline of the Bourgeois Culture [*],
it sounded catchy and I bought it.

In other words, it found its way to
a cart completely randomly.

The problem with Kondylis

—I am saying this because he is [i.e., was]
a great thinker, top—

is that he does not get out of Modernity [’s tenets].

That is, he criticizes Modernity from within,
and that creates a problem.

For example, he will talk [i.e., talked]
about mass democracy.

What is mass democracy?

Let's not open this topic, I just made a comment.

I think I agree, and it is interesting because precisely that book I showed analyzes mass democracy.

Okay, if I understood correctly the answer to the
issue of freedom and coexistence,

my understanding is that in a truly free society,
everyone is on the same level.

Authority creates hierarchies.

But if I understood well what you said, authority—through power or force, for example—is not necessarily created

institutionally, as for example, in the case of the Constitution which includes the authority of the state over the citizens.

It can be created by pure power

—as Kondylis would say—

as, for example, because I force someone
to listen to the music I want.

Would you say this is correct?

Authority monopolizes power, but it is not a precondition for the exercise of the content of authority.

Because legalization [and] acceptance is interposed.

That is, authority applies power where
there is deviant behavior.

This, after all, creates the distinction between a regime of elective monarchy and its autocratic deviation.

In the United States, in Greece, in France, in Germany,

there are many ways for political authority
to legitimate its choices [i.e., actions].

There is no need to turn to violence; to the exercise
of the monopoly of the power it has.

If, however, there is any doubt [about who has
political power], it will exercise it.

In Russia, it [i.e., the state] does have the same capabilities and mechanisms to legitimate,

that is, to make acceptable a state of
function of the πολίτευμα,

and its choices, resulting in increased suppresion, as in China, in Turkey, i.e., in countries of this regime.

Or in the Arab world.

Great, since we have set the necessary foundation,

maybe we could briefly now elucidate a distinction that first caught my attention in your work:

The distinction between democracy,
representation, and monarchy,

And perhaps the best way to introduce them
is in the reverse order.

So, can you tell us: what is monarchy? I think most understand it, but let's give a definition.

First all, purpose of the πολιτεύματα
[plural of πολίτευμα] is freedom.

This is what is being ignored today.

Weber or Durkheim, and others consider that the issue of good governance is an operational issue.

We are not interested in this.

What defines the nature of a πολίτευμα is the
relationship between the society and politics.

What is the place of the society
within the political system.

Very simply.

In this case, then, if we consider today's political system,

we [will] realize that the society has no place
within the political system.

Except for one, which is momentary.

Not in all countries; only in the advanced countries, such as the Western countries:

to vote and to elect their monarch.

and the political staff around the monarch.

This shows exactly the dimension of the political system.

Today, elective monarchy [is considered] identical with representation and democracy.

Representative democracy, and many
other [names have been used].

In any case, the political system is neither
democratic nor representative.

I'm using [as an example] today's [political system(s)] to be specific, because we have other examples throughout history.

And the Prime Minister or the President
completely owns [the political system].

Consider the Greek example.

The Prime Minister appoints and sacks [i.e.,
removes from office] the Ministers.

The Prime Minister legislates; according to the Constitution. In every Constitution.

Who introduces the bills?

The Government.

The Government is the Prime Minister.

Since he appoints and [sacks] the Ministers,

either they agree or he sacks them.

And in the Parliament, for the government to exist,
it must have the majority.

So, the Members of Parliament must
congregate and vote the bill.

As an exception, a different [decision?] may take place,

when a party, or a partisan majority, is undergoing
internal dissent. But this is the rule.

And a πολίτευμα is judged based
on the rule, not the exceptions.

So then...

The Prime Minister governs, the Prime Minister or the President—as we see in America at this moment,

where [the President] more autonomy than the Congress.

The Prime Minister, then, appoints and sacks,

the Prime Minister legislates; the Prime Minister decides who will be the candidate members of parliament.

And party leaders [behave] similarly.

Therefore, if we ask ourselves, even at
the level of elective monarchy:

“What content does the citizen’s vote have?”,

we will find out that the wording
“elective monarchy” is abusive,

because the vote [is cast] through arbitration.

Meaning, party leaderships are not selected by the society.

They are selected and recalled by the mechanisms.

Therefore, we have to do with a vote by arbitration

which we can call, abusively, “elective monarchy.”

The content [of the vote] is this.

The society is a private partner.

Therefore, the leader is both the orderer and the bearer of the mandate [issued through the vote].

This is why we have the distinction between
the society and the nation.

There is the nation of the state, which dominates,
and the nation of the society.

Why?

It [i.e., the state] must have an excuse.

Why does the Prime Minister decide?

Because it is in the interest of the nation.
Note: not in the interest of the society!

So, the [Prime Minister] herself decides
what is considered national,

she alone decides what benefits [the nation?] in the Greek-Turkish relationships,

she decides what benefits [the nation?]
in the Greek-Skopjan relationships [*],

she decides what benefits [the nation?] regarding the economy, who will get taxed and who won’t, etc.

What economic policy will be followed, etc.

So, she practices these in the name of the nation,

but not of the society.

In this way, however, the nation becomes an abstract concept

which, they tell us, was created by the state.

In fact, some recent [intellectuals], who yearn for old empires—that is, they think that the nation

is a threat to individual freedom—

they tell us that if this political system [which is based on] elective monarchy is threatened

—which contains the element of sovereignty over the society—

then, the necessity of the nation will disappear. No.

[What will happen is that] the political system of elective monarchy will cease from being the embodiment of the nation,

and [instead] the society will embody the nation.

That who owns the political system.

Representation.

Representation distinguishes...

Excuse me.

Can we make a summary of monarchy?

Elective monarchy can be hereditary, i.e.,
based on property...

S: Monarchy (?) Not elective monarchy...
C: [Yes] monarchy.

C: We have [i.e., monarchy can be] hereditary, which is the absolutism of the past.
S: Nice.

[It can be] constitutional, which is a mix of absolutism, but with constitutional preconditions.

[And lastly, it can be] elective [monarchy],

which does not have a hereditary monarch
but one who is elected,

who gives life and will to the state.

Great. And we would say that in general we have a monarchy when a body, or e.g., more specifically a prime minister,

S: concentrates all the powers [*], all the responsibilities
C: Exactly.

without being control of the society, or in general, without having any interaction with the society.

It is the concept of political sovereignity.

Great.

Which has the society as its subject.

The authority [of the monarch] is exercised
on it [i.e., the society].

This political sovereignty allows the politician not to be subject to the law, to be above it,

like the old absolute ruler.

Certain countries have introduced the
criminal ligitation [*] of a politician.

That is, if he commits petty theft or
if he violates the law.

Other [countries] have not, like Greece.

But, as far as political decisions are concerned, if [the politician] harms the society, he is not subject to justice [i.e., to the law].

And here comes Aristotle to tell us that this is why in democracies the politician,

even if he [only] gives an advice that turns out to be wrong, he is [still] subject to the law.

And, a political offence is punished more severely than if the same offence is committed by an individual,

because it harms many persons.

Consider, then, what elective monarchy means.

The society is absent.

It is a subject of the [state's] sovereignty who is obliged to act as the monarch decides.

And her supporters.

She also has the means to impose it, as we know.

Now, on the other hand, we have representation.

Let's go to the representation.

I just wanted to mention something which may be incorrect but I think it's recorded.

During the assemblies in ancient Athens,

some people who made suggestions were putting on a show with flamboyant statements like:

“if this harms the society, then burn me as follows.”

This may not be a historical phenomenon, but I think it is. I just cannot remember where I read it.

S: I just hope I didn't read it in an unreliable source.
C: In democracy,

there was a penalty that was imposed not only on those who violated the law, or who made wrong decisions,

but also on those who gave advice, and who according to the judgement of the δῆμος advised incorrectly.

Pericles, for example, was punished with a heavy fine on the second year [of the Peloponnesian War]

because Athenians judged that it was wrong
that he got them into the war [*].

Later they regretted it and took him back.

Themistocles too.

Today some find out that the ancient Greeks were ungrateful because they punished all the greats.

Well, democracy—just like any other political system—does not penalize those who own the political system.

Rather, those who serves the political system.

In democracy, the δῆμος would not punish themselves
even if they made a wrong decision.

They punished those who proposed [an action], or those who undertook a project but [failed to] deliver it properly.

According to their judgement.

The same happens today.

The Prime Minister and the Ministers are not subject to justice for their political decisions.

On the contrary, if the society reacts and [e.g.,] protests,

[the government] will use tear gas on them,
it will make them go away [, etc.]

So, the political offence applies to the citizen/subject
and not to the politician.

S: This is such a nice example.
C: No one who has the political sovereignty or responsibility

punishes himself. He punishes others.

C: Representation, then ...
S: Yes, let's move to representation.

separates the orderer (of a mandate) from the bearer.

The responsibilities that characterize the
orderer are assigned to the society.

The responsibilities that characterize the
bearer are assigned to the politician,

who will be appointed by the society.

You may ask: how does this come about? Well,
we practice this in our everyday lives.

Only in politics do we not apply it.

In our everyday life, if I assign someone to sell my apartment, I will specify the terms and conditions,

which price we will agree on...

And in the end, if I want to fire him at some
point because he doesn't do his job well,

or if I want to send him to sign [a contract] on my
behalf, I will authorize him accordingly.

If you may, describe the properties and responsibilities
of the orderer and bearer of a mandate.

Do you know how far we are historically from representation?

As far as our era is from Solon's era.

There, Ancient Greeks themselves tell us that

—they didn't know representation [i.e., they didn't give it a name], but they describe it [*] .

They tell us that the orderer—the society—has
the ability to elect—for a defined duration.

[Also, the orderer can] recall [i.e., remove someone
from office] freely and unhindered

if in the meantime [the orderer] realizes that
she doesn't like [who she appointed],

or that the bearer does not do his job well, or
she made a bad decision.

[The orderer can] check [the bearer]—she can
check his actions at any point in time—

[The orderer owns] εὐθύνειν [*]

[The orderer can] prosecute
[the politician] to punish him.

And in fact, even a single citizen has
the right to prosecute a politician

if [the politician] hurts him.

In Athens, even the slave had the right
to prosecute a politician or a citizen.

If [the citizen/politician] offended [the slave]
or treated him unfairly.

But anyway, the role of the orderer
contains these responsibilities.

But to carry them out, the society must become a body.

If it becomes a body, an institution—the ancient [Greeks] called it δῆμος—then it obtains a will.

Because it discusses, opinions are expressed,

and they end up in a decision.

The decision of the δῆμος, that is, of the body of the citizens, is not the “sum” of the opinions of each one [*].

We will not [ask each of] the 10 million Greeks,

the 1.5 billion Chinese, figure out what each one thinks, and then find the average.

What happens?

There is a discussion, and through this discussion—after the necessary briefing on the data has taken place—

2-3 dominant opinions will come up. And the majority will choose among one of them.

This is the role of the orderer of a mandate.

The bearer [of the mandate to carry out the decision] will then take over to implement these decisions.

However, the representation is a transitional stage;
it is a bridge between

the two main πολιτεύμα-τα which are: monarchy and democracy.

So the main object for which must talk is democracy.

Many say the democracy of Athens is pre-modern, it [belongs to the] past, and we are superior.

Excuse me, let's spend a moment on representation.

I just want to use a simple comparison to make the responsibilities you mentioned understood.

So, we mentioned ἐκλέγειν.

Let's take an example.

I explained it this way to a friend,
and he seemed to like it.

Let's say we appoint someone as our representative
to go get some food for us.

First,

we have the ability of ἐκλέγειν, as you said.

That is, we get to choose who this representative will be. Second, we have the ability of ἀνακαλεῖν.

That is, for example, while this person

is going to get us the food, we can say “I choose to discontinue this agreement.”

Third, we have the ἐλέγχειν,

and Ι think it is helpful to think of it as having a say, or specifying, the content of the mandate. Right?

We tell him what food or cigarettes we want him to get us.

Exactly.

So, for example, we do not simply say “go get
us whatever food you want.”

Yes.

For example, we can set some limits,
e.g., that I don't eat spicy food.

You can get anything else, but not spicy.

Also, something else you have mentioned in the book, is that the mandate is active for a specific time period.

S: That is, this person is not appointed as our representative...
C: Tomorrow...

Right.

He cannot buy food for himself with my money.

Yes, and also that there are specific limits to
the mandate itself.

Meaning, the fact that he is my representative
in getting food for me,

does not mean he can also go get my car from car repair.

C: Precisely.
S: And the last thing you mentioned is εὐθύνειν,

I think this is simple. It simply means that if e.g., I have told him not to get spicy food but he does so anyway,

then he will have to face the consequences.

For me, though, the interesting part is the
true attribution of responsibilities

is predicated on specifying the content of a mandate.

C: Of course
S: Because if the mandate does not have any content....

For example, if we have a prime minister
who has all the responsibilities,

meaning, she is not restricted in any way,

then how can we judge whether what she did was within the limits or not, since there were no limits to begin with.

So there must be the δῆμος that will determine
the content of politics.

It is implied that those who are have the [relevant] political interest will propose a plan.

So, the question that will come up is to what degree
they are following this plan, which the society will adopt.

Do you know how modern [scholars] get over this?

With the concept of the blank check [*].

A blank check means a carte blanche [*] authorization, which means giving up on representation.

A blank check implies giving up.

That is, it is the admission, not that the political system preserves its representative character,

but that it stopped having its representative
character, and it is a monarchy.

Besides, shouldn't the orderer have the right,

not only recall someone who she elected,

but also to recall the mandate she gave, and to establish herself as a dominant reality?

We don't even have this right today.

As such, in no case is the following opinion substantiated: that the system is representative [*],

and that because it is representative, it is also democratic. Because, even if the most imaginative God,

as I've often said, is called to combine these three πολιτεύμα-τα into one,

he/she will not be able to do it; because it is impossible, they are incompatible with each other.

(1) For a single person to govern, (2) for them to partly govern, and (3) for the society to govern [*].

Let's move to democracy.

When these definitions became clear to me, the incompatibility of these three systems also became clear.

This incompatibility which sounds so peculiar
the first time you come across it.

You think “how can representation and
democracy be incompatible?”

But I think that when the definitions come in
place, it becomes perfectly clear.

So, please tell us: what is democracy?

I must make something clear, though. That what
you hear are only my opinions.

You will not find them anywhere,

even among those who say that the system is not democratic and that democracy is such and such;

even they do not have any elementary
understanding of what democracy is

and what its purpose is.

It is simply that at some point they read or heard about the Athenian democracy, they just repeat [what they read].

And most importantly, they do not believe them.

Democracy, like every system, has a purpose, as I said.

Democracy has the purpose not only of individual freedom, but of individual, social and political freedom.

All bundled together and cumulatively.

So, institutionalization that will not contain the political, economic, or social hierarchy.

Here, there is a difference, of course,

with the Athenian democracy.

The Athenian democracy exercised
universal freedom through politics,

but it did not exercise the democratic
principle in the economic system.

The Greek world applied the democratic principle in the economic system much later, especially in Byzantium.

But let's leave that aside.

We'll concern ourselves with the economic aspect. For now, let's remain within the political dimension if possible.

I will speak very briefly about it because it is easy.

Democracy presupposes to remove, to
uproot the whole political system,

and I mean the government, the parliament, the courts,

and whatever political is contained
in the concept of administration.

In the narrow sense as you said before, right?

To leave to the state only the executive branch of the administration, in the narrow sense,

and δῆμος to pick up everything else; the Ἐκκλησία of δῆμος.

Or, when it comes to justice, the Ἡλιαία.

Just to be sure, when you say “executive branch,” you mean the processing/handling aspects, right?

Not “executive” as in the “executive power”
we know of today.

There is no executive power, there is governmental power.

There would be executive power if the parliament
were a sovereign instrument.

The parliament puts its signature where the monarch decides.

In fact, it is redundant.

They act there so that the society sees
what happens. They do not legislate.

I do not know if you have noticed [what
happens] in the Greek Parliament.

It is good for this to be heard beyond Greece’s
borders, so that they may be ashamed.

Legislation, when the party leaders are not present, is not carried out by raising one's hand, or anything else,

among the Members of Parliament.

The Parliament is empty, completely empty, and the president [*] recites the names of the members.

And he says: “if [the member] is part of the government, he/she votes in favor, otherwise he/she votes against.”

That is, simply by reading the names.

Such an abusive application of the
Constitution takes place that,

if there were any justice, these laws
should have been annulled [*].

Similarly when it comes to party discipline,
again [it would have been] invalid.

But there is no justice and they are enforced.

Anyway, democracy means that the whole political system is passed onto the society which governs,

legislates, and tries.

Many claim that [in such a scheme] there is
no separation of powers.

It important to say that.

There is no separation of powers because
in democracy there is no power.

There is a separation of functions;
Aristotle highlighted it.

That is, the δῆμος assumes one role—that
of the Ἐκκλησία—to govern,

a different role to legislate, and with a different constitution—that of Ἡλιαία—it tries.

Not all cases, the main cases, because there are other

courts that handle other cases where the
society need not participate.

In this context, the separation of functions is what matters, and not of powers.

Is it not the same that is happening today?

The separation of powers was devised by Montesquieu

to relax the over-concentration of the state, due to ownership, by the monarch.

Let us give some authority to the Parliament, again of the feudal lords, and have some kind of autonomous justice.

That is, laws that are not [only] those
considered laws by the monarch.

Today, then, don't all these three powers
belong to the state?

Isn't the state owned by the political system,
which is a monarchy?

Similarly there by the πολιτεία.

As we said before, the monarch governs and legislates.

There, the δῆμος governs and legislates.

And justice is owned, in small part, by the state. The political authority sets the terms, and decides.

But there is a difference between monarchy and democracy.

That in democracy there is no subject of sovereignty.

We saw earlier that

in the political system the sovereign is the owner of the authority, i.e., of the state. The subject of sovereignity

is the whole society, and each individual independently.

Here [i.e., in democracy] there is no subject of sovereignity. Why?

Because the government that is formed within the Ἐκκλησία of δῆμος does not constitute an authority.

Its decisions concern one specific topic at a time.

Therefore,

even the principle of the majority
[i.e., the majority rule],

which is not the essence of democracy, it is a principle used by all πολιτεύματα, to be able to decide among many.

So, the majority rule is not applied with
duration, as in authority.

So, today's decision regarding how sidewalks
or universities should be, for example,

has nothing do with the next decision
that will concern something else.

It does not constitute a system of authority.

Thus, it does not constitute the notion of sovereignity.

All citizens are in par in the decision-making,

for the specific issues, and not for the authority.

Let's ask ourselves, which citizen would restrict his responsibilities or his enjoyment of individual freedom?

No one. That is obvious.

Nevertheless, modern thinkers, starting with Montesquieu, Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and everyone up to this day,

claim that democracy is the despotism,
i.e., the absolutism, of the δῆμος.

But... If there is no subject of sovereignity,
how can absolutism be applied?

There is no authority.

So, we find ourselves in the midst of a complete misunderstanding, and intentional ideological choice

so as not to reach there [i.e., democracy].

However, they should not worry, of course, because
democracy is not dated to the time of our era.

It is a distant matter.

We will talk about the prospect of representation,
which is near, if you will,

because it depends on the relationship
between society and economy,

and this has been overturned today, but
there is no prospect of democracy.

We must think about it at the level of science,
knowledge, and not kid [i.e., deceive] ourselves.

We should not think that we are living in a different
time than the one we are living in.

Great!

I like it because you are transitioning on your own towards the trajectory that the discussion is naturally following.

Would you like, then, to discuss the solutions and challenges when it comes to approaching a democracy?

Of course.

First of all, I would like to mention a general principle that is valid, and which Cosmosystemic Science suggests.

That, as we said, the social cosmos has an evolutionary biology, and once societies enter into the realm of freedom,

it follows the path that we have already
known from the Greek world.

We do not have to use our imagination a lot,
only to read the historical past.

What does this mean?

When there is a dialectic relationship between economic property—note, not capital, but economic property—

and society,

The more economic property becomes dominant
—as it increases in power—

the more the societies come closer to and
into politics to balance it out.

They will not find the balance by going on strikes, because the societies—we know it today—are outside the system,

while economic property owns the system—both
the economic and, in its way, the political.

Therefore, the solution will come with the
gradual entry of societies into politics.

Politics works as a referee,

that is, as a parameter producing a balance
between the economy and the society.

Project the following thought.

Today, big global businesses—and it is
important to mention this:

The societies are required to live within
the environment of the state,

because this is where the political system
on which they can intervene exists.

They cannot take the plane, as they were telling us in the past several imaginative intellectuals,

to globalize the labor movement. and they held festivals in
Geneva, in Brazil, and elsewhere.

The political decisions, the economic decisions will be made within the society, within the countries.

But economy has become global.

It crosses countries horizontally.

This is because it is closer to, and has appropriated, the communication technologies,

and uses it as its terrain.

It invests in China in the morning, in Japan in the afternoon, in the U.S. in the evening, depending
on the time difference.

It transfers the production base to China,

and produces there the mobile phone for
3 euros and sells it for 300 or 1000.

Or shoes, or other things.

It draws surplus value.

The consequence is that the economic property, which has now been transformed to Διεθνής των Αγορών,

has gained enormous power.

As a result, it has trampled on most rights of societies.

We see the middle classes suffering. We see the labor rights becoming labor-commodity. And many other.

How will this be balanced out? How will
a new balance be created?

We see it with international mobility.

Have you noticed how close the Διεθνής των Αγορών
is today with to the [political] Left,

at the level of the movement of labor,
and not only of capital?

Once the left said that we must grab our military jackets [*] and our weapons, and go to Spain and elsewhere

to fight for the revolution of the working class. This is not what they are saying today.

They are saying: let us empty Pakistan from
ambiguity, as well as other countries,

and move them here. So, both leaving the Διεθνής των Αγορών there to do whatever it wants,

and here exerting pressure towards the
labor of the citizens.

This mixture and meeting of two historical opponents
on the issue of the Διεθνής των Αγορών,

is of great importance because none of them
feels that they represent society.

Let's think about it.

If it was necessary today—I assume an emulation of representation—[for the society] to consent with a poll.

It is a precise element [i.e., tool] for
valuing the social will.

Even if they do not accept it.

With a poll to consent on the fiscal system.

With a poll to consent on the A or B political decision.

What would be the mixture of politics that
a government would follow?

Would it be the same?

No, of course not.

Because [for a bill] to become a law, it would have to elicit the consent of the society.

This is, then, the importance of politics.

That is why we observe that in this dialectical
relationship between economic property,

which is able—through the laws that exist—to accumulate impossible [volumes of] capital,

and the society is deprived of the essentials,

through this process, we are led to a result, which we now see as an unconventional behavior.

You can see the disdain of the parties and the unions.

Why?

Because the image of the future was not formed.

The societies continue to fight based on the
past of the 18th century, to go on strike,

when the economic property has been riding the communication technologies and has been transported to the future.

And that is it oppresses and deprives this.

Both on a global scale—

a massive redistribution of infinite size—

and within the countries.

So, this is why we find ourselves on this verge which takes place through unconventional behaviors,

which, the day after tomorrow [i.e., in the future],
will also become antisystemic

—in the sense of overcoming the elective monarchy—behaviors and demands.

[This is] exactly because only through politics can we restore the balance [*]

that was partially achieved within states in the past.

This, then, is a process which leads [us] to the same dialectic relationship in the future.

And if this reality gets assimilated, and Διεθνής των Αγορών—the economic property—

acquires more big potential [*], then we will escape from representation and we will reach democracy.

Until, I would say, when even the relative balances
will not be able to be restored,

which will not be developed only within the states but also in international relationships—with terms of solidarity—

at that point we will reach to what the Greek world establishes, that is, to the ecumenical transition;

from the state-centrism to the Οἰκουμένη.

Another matter which I think we
should not discuss now because

it is very far away for the contemporary
person to comprehend.

Yes, I think you touched on a lot of topics.

Let's consider, hopefully not in a myopic way,
some specific challenges, and solutions.

The first question I have, to be honest, originates in a comment on Aristotle. It says:

It is interesting that I don't have a translation in front of me, so we will see how this will turn out...

Tell me and we will see. I may be able to do it.

Let's see.

“τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἴσον δοκεῖ εἶναι.” I would translate that as [*]: what is just is supposed to be equality.

“ἴσον δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι κύριον”

That is, perhaps: equality is when what
the majority believes prevails.

“ἐλεύθερον δὲ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν βούληταί τις ποιεῖν”

That is, perhaps: freedom is that
everyone does what they want.

That's roughly how I would translate it...

I mention that mainly because what
Aristotle says is nice and all,

but there is a translator and commentator of Aristotle,

I will use the English name, although he has Greek origins: Hippocrates G. Apostle.

He writes [*].

Let's a take small pause because I to ask you this.

You have studied Aristotle a lot, and I would like to ask you: which source do you use?

I am asking because, for me, the best translation of Aristotle [in English] is the one I mentioned.

This one, by Hippocrates G. Apostle.

I have never encountered any other translation
with so much consistency.

That is, every Ancient Greek term will always be translated with the same English term.

On the other hand, the problem of this edition is that it does not have the Ancient Greek text,

and in my opinion without that you can't study it seriously.

So, I'm doing double work... I have bought this, which has both a translation and the Ancient Greek text,

but the translation is not that good.

So I use this for the Ancient Greek text,
and this for the translation.

With two editions of Politics I even bought
a third edition in Modern Greek,

which I will not mention because I do not think it is good.

And I do not know if there is a good translation [of Politics] in Modern Greek.

The discussion about translation in Modern Greek is long...

So, I wanted to ask you which source you use because I,

as a Greek, have ended up reading English
translations of Ancient Greek texts.

I don't know if you want to mention names.
If not, please don't.

But if someone asked you, to put it colloquially: I want a translation of Aristotle to understand what he says [*],

where should I begin?

I would tell him to read the original, to fight it [i.e., to stick with it and try to read it].

She does not need to take courses in Philology or Language studies to understand an ancient text.

I learned to read the Byzantine texts, which are in Atticized Koine [Greek] writing,

through the torture of the texts.

And in Ancient [Greek] [I approached it] roughly like that.

Because even the best translation,

because the translator does not know the [socioeconomic, political, etc.] climate of that period,

[the translator] cannot translate, and the reader cannot understand, the ancient text.

For instance, if you gave me this translation which you believe to be very good,

I would show you a number of problems.

For example, how does it translate the concept “ἀρχή” [?]

It would translate it as “authority.”

If it translated it as “authority,” it lost [*].

For me, the biggest problem with this translation is that, if I remember correctly [*],

it translates the term “πολιτεία” as “government.”

It's over. It's garbage [*].

I agree [*].

“Πολιτεία” is the socioeconomic and political system [*].

Poor Aristotle says it. So does Plato and Thucydides.

Everyone says it.

It's just...

What did I tell you before we started?

That today the notion of Science or Philosophy does
nothing else but considering novel our era,

superior to any other era,

and interpreting the past with contemporary projections,
and in fact evaluative projections.

It does not introduce the comparison in the cosmohistoric time, [or] at least in the anthropocentric time [*].

So you realize

that it will evaluate the democracy of Athens.

the way they us. That because it had slavery, because it did not have women [*], and because it is at the age of πόλις,

we cannot be discussing it today.

It is inferior.

So, from the πόλις we will not move back
to the past to get democracy [from it].

We will take the principles of democracy, we will cogitate on the “why” of democracy at the specific time,

and not sooner or later,

the “how” of democracy, and we will pose the
question[s] in our age, and we will say:

“why don't we have [it] today?”

What parameters exist today that do not
make democracy feasible?

Let me give you an example.

Today we have the grand scale, the nation-state, with whatever this entails in everything,

and that which was caused in the meantime,
the communication technology.

On all levels, from Artificial Intelligence to everything.

But from the perspective of evolution—meaning anthropocentric evolution—

which has freedom as a sign [i.e., determinant],

we are in the pre-Solonian era.

So we in the very beginning, we came out of feudalism 2 days ago. A person cannot be born at the stage of maturity.

He will be born at the beginning
and will progress day by day.

Admiring his father or grandfather at the age of 5, he will not leap forward in time to become 60, 70, or 50 years old.

You can realize, then, that this biological course
confesses where we are today.

In the grand scale that produces such a [huge] technological civilization—it necessarily makes the human think—

but from an anthropocentric perspective—that is, evolution of the human condition—we are in the premature stage.

The Greek world has the ability, if someone
views it in terms of a cosmosystem,

to draw from it the whole evolutionary course of the human condition regarding in a state of freedom.

And to know which factors led from one day to the next.

So you realize that such a view produces results to satisfy the present and not to interpret the “then.”

You mentioned that the majority is the head.

I'm sorry, let us finish one topic before we go to the next.

I want to ask a question on this topic of the texts and translations, because it troubles me a lot.

Besides, the reason I'm learning French is to
be able to read the originals.

Anyway I am struggling through the ancient text, which is why I said I have this edition.

Otherwise, I would have only the other.

But, when someone is starting out, I'm afraid that if you don't consult a translation, then you will use dictionaries.

But this can also be misleading.

Here is an example I am thinking of
that we considered with a linguist.

It is the famous: “ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ἵνα φοβῆται τὸν ἄνδρα.” [*]

That “φοβῆται” is obviously something that we would understand today as “φοβάται” [to be afraid of] [*] .

And also, if someone looks it up in a dictionary [e.g., LSJ]

—at least in my search in serious, I think, Ancient Greek dictionaries—

will find it translated it as “to be afraid of.”

However, an interpretation is... I cannot judge its correctness, but all translations of the New Testament

both Greek and English, do not say “be afraid of,”
they say “respect.” [*]

So, there is a subtlety which, especially
when we are talking about...

And the translation problems in the New Testatement are not so difficult because it is written in Koine Greek.

It is not in the language Aristotle wrote in, or in the much harder language of Thucydides.

For example, I can approach Aristotle but
I cannot approach Thucydides.

So, what does someone do in these cases? Does she insist on the ancient text using dictionaries?

You mentioned an example that is very characteristic.

Indeed.

If you consider that text as a whole, you will find out that he/it wants the couple to be “one flesh.”

And the man to leave his house and to
become one with his wife.

Therefore, it creates a mutual relationship which, for the conditions of that time, is a revolution.

Because it is inspired by the Greek example and integrates the woman within the family, as a contributor,

and not as a slave/maid of the family.

But regarding the study of ancient texts, I
always give the following advice.

Have the original text, read from a translation, but cross-check mainly the terminology with the ancient text.

But by already having an idea of what the notions mean.

Because this is what is missing.

Someone was telling me that a German staged Sophocles’ Antigone in the Ancient Theatre of Epidaurus.

And he depicted Creon and his system
as a representative democracy.

What other epitome of a glorification,

and distortion of the play itself, [could he have done] to legitimize the present system?

What lack of awareness can this person have, who they allowed to be there, and to essentially engage in propaganda

through an ancient tragedy which
concerns the political system?

[We can] read a translation but while having a glance—the left or the right eye—aligned to the ancient text [*].

This is my advice.

S: Strictly as an auxiliary medium and not as the primary source.
C: Yes, yes!

First of all, this way she will learn Ancient [Greek], but also she will be able to cross-check the translation.

Understood.

Let's move to this issue of the majority.

I simply mentioned a—let’s call it—disagreement of this translator in his commentary [*].

But let me frame it more generally.

You have touched upon this topic, obviously.
And now you just mentioned it.

Indicatively, let me read an excerpt.

The majority rule which—you probably mean “Modernity”—presents as a foundation of democracy

in no case does it establish the political sovereignty of a class which, once it legally predominates at a certain time,

it goes to transform the political process into an authority system with society as a subject.

Translation for people like me:

You are describing what is happening today.
We have a majority

which allows a party to dominate for the next 4 years.

You then say:

“The majority rule is important mainly during an assemly/session and the decision,"

“and to a completely secondary degree
for the election of magistrates."

That is it matters when we congregate, we discuss, and at some point we need to decide on an issue.

On that you comment:

“As such, the majority does not constitute a system of authority over the society of the citizens”

“or part of it, and if anything with
a time horizon [i.e., duration]”

“It is concerned with the specific case, and it can also change from one moment to the next,”

“either by adopting a new proposal,
or due to another issue, etc.” [*]

And I generally agree that yes, we have a problem now that for example, in a very limited time horizon

some vote in favor [of some decision], some against it, then we have another issue, the majority always changes.

However, how can we avoid the event
in which there is a majority

By the way, in Greek we distinguish between μειοψηφία [i.e., fewer in number] and μειονότητα [as in “racial minority”],

which is not the case in English,
and it is a very big problem.

I use the term μειοψηφία [fewer in number] very deliberately because to me it is much better defined [*].

That is a different discussion...

In any case, it is a [numerical] majority...

For example there may be a sub-group connected through an identity—national, cultural, ideological—it doesn't matter,

which constantly—through these isolated decisions—
oppresses some [numerical] minority.

How can this be avoided?

First of all, I remind [everyone] that which  I have explained [before], regarding what it means

to have a [numerical] minority and
majority in an elective monarchy.

You said it before. That essentially the political...

The Greek language has this ability
[to express this distinction],

other languages do not, because they
did not reach that point.

The political numerical minority ends up
becoming a social minority.

That is, for the 4 years or so outside
the choices of the political system.

However, the political majority ends
up becoming a social minority too!

In other words, just as the πολιτειακή autonomy of a social minority—to decide for its issues within a state—is not recognized,

the same happens with the whole of society.

That is, the government owns the role of the orderer of the mandate, and that of the bearer,

so it concetrates the notion of the majority,
or better, of the unanimity,

and everyone else is in the margins, in the ἰδιωτεία [i.e., it is only a private partner].

Right, but let's not talk more about monarchy.

Let's go, then, to democracy.

Yes, let's assume that we have a democracy, we have sessions of discussions, in which as you say, the majority

plays a secondary role and only when it
comes to voting for specific issues, etc.

But it seems to me—obviously, on the one hand, a desideratum—but also perhaps unrealistic

to believe that there will not exist a majority that will constantly oppress someone else through the decisions.

There was a problem here [i.e., a related problem].

To some extent, democracy tackled it.

For example, it developed the multi-πολιτειακή
structure of the πόλις.

Let's consider Athens.

There is the political system of whole of the territory, with the Ἐκκλησία of δῆμος in Pnyx.

But every village, every neighborhood, every district in the city has its own πολιτειακή institutionalization,

autonomy and decides for its own [issues].

There is also another case. For example, the Parliament, [or the] ἀρχές, are not structured [*]

based on the majority rule over all
citizens in the [state] territory.

Across the U.S., across Greece...

Rather, every φυλή [*], so, every δῆμος of
Attica sends its own representatives.

Previously, you know, the following had happened. [*]

Before democracy appeared. I will say it
because it is more probative.

The election of an ἄρχων did not happen
like in the time of Solon,

when the election happened among the
citizens of the state, the city.

Rather, they sent a separate representative to the central authority those who lived at a valley,

a separate [representative] those who lived in the mountains, and a separate one those who lived on the coast.

As a result, the sectional interests did not disappear
in a universal majority rule.

However, Aristotle directs criticism here and he is right.

Aristotle accepts all the principles of democracy.

What he inscribes as his πολιτεία is all the principles of democracy, but with a very interesting addition,

which introduces the principle of social moderation [*].

That is, he thinks that

democracy can become one-sided through the
application of the majority rule universally.

Meaning, if the majority is the majority [i.e., primarily composed] of the members of the lowest class [*],

and the group of the rich cannot pass its issues,

then it means that democracy is becoming class-based.

Of course, not class-based in the sense
we know of it today [i.e., class society],

but that the largest part is connected with a specific character of the political decisions.

Demosthenes puts it in a characteristic way.

“It only remains for me to advise you on what
you should do.”

“You are the ones who will direct me with your thought and will regarding what I will suggest.” [*]

In other words, if down there [i.e., in the crowd]
most of you are poor,

to get my opinion across, I must propose ideas for the poor, policies for the poor, and ignore the rich.

How does Aristotle propose to solve this?

By limiting the social extremes—of the rich and the poor—and by creating a central pillar of a middle class,

such that, essentially, if that class is the hegemon, then the interests of both sides will meet.

You [can] see, then, that the evolution

is not an idealistic state that leads us from monarchy to the ideal πολίτευμα of democracy.

It is a dynamic state, which has to do with that which we described; the relationship among the opponents

—the economy and the society—

which nonetheless corresponds [i.e., adapts] to the conditions of this dynamic relationship.

So, democracy, just like any πολίτευμα, is not ideal.

It is a πολίτευμα that comes to satisfy a specific era

in the closest  [way] to the conditions
of natural life of the humans.

So, that most are satisfied, and not only the few.

Both at level of εὐ ζῆν, and at the level of freedom.

Yes, I agree with that.

I agree that the few are not the only ones satisfied.

Because, through the assemblies, the
majority makes the decisions, etc.

The question is: how are the few not oppressed?

If I understood it correctly,

the first solution you suggested sounds like what the Founding Fathers of the U.S. envisioned.

I have some notes here from John Adams, James Madison...

It does not really matter...

What did they envision?

That [political system] which they called a Republic, as they were opposed to democracy [*],

in fact they said it out loud, and they
envisioned the representatives.

Elective monarchy. They never accepted
the notion of representation. Never.

They interpreted it according to the Enlightenment thinkers. That is, Montesquieu and the rest [*].

That it is the inferred representation; the carte blanche.

Because they would elect the political leaders, it meant that they also were also bearers.

Institutionally, they were not.

Ok, let us move past this.

Let's go to the pressing issue.

Sure, the few will not dominate in a democracy.

But how do we avoid the oppression of the few?

In the Aristotle's proposal you presented, it seems that the solution is the homogenization.

S: As you said
C: No.

No, no. Aristotle accepts... I am sorry for the interruption, I should clarify it from the start

so that we do not proceed on a line
of thinking that does not hold.

Aristotle accepts that the society is πολλά,
and should remain πολλά [*].

Social πολλά—meaning, social stratification—and
in everything.

He wants to create a social balance where the middle class will not disappear in favor of the lowest class,

as it was called, that is, the proletariat
class of that period.

Rather, [Aristotle wanted the middle class] to have a regulatory role so that—he says—

the few—the oligarchs—would also be satisfied, [they would] also have a share of the politics.

To [allow them to] assume the ἀρχές, so that not
everything is owned by the δῆμος.

So that they could also be satisfied, and not revolt.

This is the care [that is necessary to be taken] so that political revolts do not occur.

But, we need to keep in mind the following.

Democracy does not oppress because it does
not exercise political sovereignty [*].

You may ask:

how are we going to define the notion of oppression?

For instance, the first [issue] oligarchs—the rich, if you like—raised to the council in Corinth [*]

to Philip and then to Alexander, was
that the rich not get taxed [*].

Because democracy stopped taxing the sovereign
of the situation—i.e., the citizen—,

it established the liturgies [*], the funding, etc.

That is, Themistocles proposed to build the 300 triremes so that Athens enter the sea with full sails [*],

and then to defend itself in consideration of the threat of the Persians, [and he] proposed some

to take on, each separately, the construction and maintenance of one trimere [*] .

This is something the rich originally did not consider, but later did consider, heavy and oppressive.

Is it oppressive for someone not [sic] to be taxed

by a state which creates the conditions
for him to become rich?

Doesn't he have to give a part of the wealth he produces, under state law, to the rest of the society?

In fact, when he gets, as [someone?] had been discharged back then, from the economic process, how would they live?

Thus, we see that the interpretations being
given have to do with the special interests.

And the most special interest here was

that which the rich stated: that they considered
it oppression to be taxed.

It's not possible.

You know, in the early days of the πόλις, in the era of the elective monarchy—in the era of Solon—,

the request was the equal land distribution—the equal share—and the remission from lending.

So that they could be citizens of the πόλις and to survive.

In the era of democracy, no one cares about ownership.

The δῆμος does not care who owns the property.

Rather, it cares about the redistribution of wealth,
of the economic product.

Because it has become a bourgeois population.

So you see that things change in the process.

And in this context there is no issue of oppression because there is no mechanism of oppression.

There is no political sovereignty.

S: There is no authority in the form of an institution.
C: Exactly.

It will sound trite,

but let's assume that we are part of a society in which 70% of the persons are white, and the 30% are black.

If we assume that the whites are negatively predisposed towards the black persons due to racist sentiments,

how do we prevent white persons from oppressing
black persons through the majority?

Note that I do not assume that the white persons
have formed an institution,

or that there is a state, or institutional authority.

I am asking: in the constant assemblies, how do we prevent the white persons from oppressing the black persons?

Is it not avoided.

It is a dynamic situation.

Democracy, as Aristotle himself notes, who did not have in front of him the example of the white and black persons,

he had that of the rich and the poor.

But it is the same by analogy: that the one side will feel that it is being deprived through the majority.

However, they will also benefit in many other issues because they will take part in the political process;

in the decision-making process.

For example, in democracy the regime that functioned until the 1960s in the United States could not function;

the regime in which the black [person]
was excluded even from the schools,

and there was this whole apartheid and this
whole world [i.e., regime] of exclusion.

Why though?

Because you do not suggestion individual rights, correct?

Today such issues are supposed to be solved
by individual rights, labor rights, etc.

Since we are in the domain of freedom, and the
solution you suggest is not through rights,

to avoid such phenomena, right?

Let me give you an example.

Sure.

Xenophon, or Pseudo-Xenophon to some, because it is not certain who wrote it, but it does not matter...

There is an essay [by (Pseudo-)Xenophon] for the Athenian democracy, apart from Aristotle's [*].

He makes a reference to the slaves.

Mm-hmm.

And he mentions there—of course we have other examples too, but this the most characteristic.

He mentions that the slaves in Athens, without being citizens, have gained huge responsibilities for themselves.

For instance, no is entitled to abuse him
[i.e., the slave], [or] to insult him.

In fact, he says that most slaves are better
dressed than the poor citizens [*].

They can have a family, they can have ownership.

There also the “χωρὶς οἰκοῦντας” who are enterpreneurs [*].

The banker, but not only him, Athens was a slave [*].

I am referring you to a scene in Aristophanes' Wasps, where in the dialogue between the citizen—the young person

who has become rich and the father who
is poor lives off of the salary by Ἐκκλησία,

and the rich son suggests to him to leave the Ἐκκλησία, and in return he will provide him with a large staff, servants,

wealth, comfort, a house, a palace, etc., and he responds with: sure, but I will be like the “χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες” slaves.

You see, then, that here we have a social category which is worse than that of black persons, which is the slaves.

And yet, a slave in Athens had the right—obtained the right

—I am not [even] talking about the metics
who were much more—

he obtained the right to be able to indict a
prominent politician to the Ἐκκλησία,

and win the case because he insulted him.

So you see that inside the funnel of δῆμος all the dissimilar situations infiltrate to have influence.

Note again that I am not idealizing.

But I am referring to a reality which is a given that it provides many more capabilities

—because we are talking about freedom—

than another reality where we are talking about rights.

[When it comes to] the right as heteronomy, one awaits...

You see it today when it comes to anything that is claimed regarding the private state of any individual.

We await for some authority to legislate it.

We do not legislate it ourselves.

Exactly these phenomena which you appeal to—and it is very serious, and we should appeal to them—

we do not come across them in democracy; that is, in the philology that has been developed around democracy.

Not because they were not discussed. Back then, all these social phenomena were in the daily agenda.

Whether the slave should remain a slave or be freed. Because [it was?] against nature, and including everything.

But there is a difference.

The relationship between freedom and equality.

You would know very well that today this philology distinguishes freedom from equality.

Equality is one thing, freedom is another.

C: And this is caused by the fact that
S: Right.

S: Let me mention that I have a related book: Equality.
C: Exactly.

Do you know what has caused this misunderstanding?

Because it is a result of our era, as it is the
premature, antrhopocentrically, era.

Which has the individual freedom which the West had contrary to equality which the [then] existing socialism projected.

What is the problem?

That the one side was against equality,
while the other against freedom.

That is why those who were in favor of
equality were led to totalitarianism

—they did not allow the development of individual freedom—

[while] the other side led [us] to the excessive
expansion through equal opportunity.

That is, the West adopted only the equality before the law, and that [only] under [certain] conditions.

So what is the reality?

That equality is a by-product and a measure of freedom.

They are not two separate notions.

That is, if freedom is focused on individual freedom,

then equality comes to satisfy the
elements of individual freedom.

Rule of law, as it is called;

then equality of opportunities in the sense of

going through college and then getting
integrated into the economic reality;

the capability of taking advantage as a con artist, or as a cunning person, or as a beneficiary of an inheritance,

so that he also become a millionaire and a shipowner, etc.

And in the past where equality wanted... Not in our era, of course, because equality was equated to

the abolition of ownership and proletarianization
of the whole society,

but in the Greek World, equality was equated
to the equal distribution of land.

Back then they used to say: “ἰσάζειν” when it comes to property equals “ἰσάζειν” when it comes to freedom.

This changes entirely when we get to universal freedom,
so to the social and political freedom.

Where does equality go then?

It preserves the equality before the law—πολιτεία of law—, it abandons equality in terms of property,

and concentrates equality with regards
to political freedom [*].

That is Aristotle tells about the fragmentation [*], and not equal distribution, of the politics,

[as] that would lead to the destruction of the society, but to the fragmentation of the individual before politics.

In other words, if we are 5 people owning
an appartment—a house...

It is like a commune. It is not the case that
everyone has a room.

It is not the case that everyone has a piece. All of us own it, in its entirety, ab indiviso.

That is, every citizen is an owner of the
whole political system ab indiviso,

but because it has the role of a member [μόριο],

she has equal power as the next citizen, who also owns the whole political system ab indiviso [*].

Using contemporary terminology, I think
one could conceive of it as having stock.

But with an important condition: everyone has one share and no one can buy someone else's shares.

C: No, it does not apply.
S: Ah, why?

What is true is what I told you: the
ab indiviso part of a thing.

We can own a corporation ab indiviso. We can
own a house ab indiviso.

We can own ab indiviso something else.

Well, it is simplification, but is it not this what
a stock represents?

In a company, a share does not mean that I own a specific piece, e.g., this particular computer.

Yes but one share does not [i.e., should not]
equal five shares, that someone else owns.

That is why I added the condition no one can buy someone else's shares. Everyone has one share.

If each one has one share [, then it is fine].

Here [i.e., in this case], a citizen's vote has the same weight [as any other citizen's].

But note that her vote has the same weight in the decision-making process.

So, when we talk about a vote, we need to ask ourselves: what is the content of the vote?

The content of our vote today is only
the election of the next monarch.

Neither any punishment, nor [keeping the
monarch in] check, or anything.

The vote in democracy has the content of a
decision on something specific.

On an issue that needs to be taken care of by the Ἐκκλησία.

Yes, I think I understand.

It is obvious that not everybody agrees.

The [numerical] minority does not agree with a decision.

But there is no possibility of unanimity.

We [should] know that.

That is why Aristotle does not propose
the abolition of democracy.

In fact, he proposes the social moderation [*] in which everyone will agree with the goal.

Let's not forget that Aristotle develops
a very interesting dialogue [*]

—you will find it in the book Democracy as Freedom [*]—

that has to do with who decides more correctly
about the social...

Note, not the general [*], but the common interest.

One, the few, or the many. And through a magnificent—I would say; as far as the argument is concerned—line of reasoning,

he concludes that most correct decisions
are the decisions of the δῆμος,

and not the decisions of a single [person] or of few.

And if I am not mistaken, right after that in your
book you mention some objections he had.

Yes.

Alright, moving towards the end, I would
like to touch upon two main topics.

The first is a practical issue. You have talked about the use of opinion polls many times.

This tool which I also think is quite useful.

I have in mind some specific problems
that may arise in polls.

One has to do with how a question is presented.

And based on how it is presented,
the answers change significantly.

Let me give you a specific example.

I will be translating a passage from a book, Democracy for Realists, which I think consider good.

It includes the following example [*]:

In the weeks leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, almost two- thirds of Americans were willing to “use military force,”

but fewer than half were willing to “engage in combat,” and fewer than 30% were willing to “go to war.”

Especially in English, I think we could agree
that these three are the same.

Yet, in one case we have a 66% support, in
the other 50%, and in the other 30%.

So the question that arises is: what is
the real will of the people?

Because here there is no right or wrong.

This is another problem of politics; that it is not like
mathematics, where we can judge how right a society is,

and thus conclude that it is more correct to phrase it in this way because it leads to the correct response.

I will come back to this because it is the crucial issue, but I would a question reversing the example and argument.

Expressing doubts about the correctness of the opinions of the societies, does that mean we have...

Not correctness. I am sorry for interrupting you,
but this is important.

I am not asking “which is the correct answer,”
because I do not think it exists.

What I am asking is: how do we know what
the society really wants?

C: I will come to that
S: Ah, ok.

But first there is an issue regarding the fear of societies.

I see, please.

In a matter with someone from the European Council

when he/she expressed the doubts as to what
degree the societies can have an opinion,

I explained how the societies can have an opinion.

I said: “Would you tell me, do you mean
that the governors today are so good”

“that it is dangerous to take the authority away
from them and give it somewhere else?”

S: I agree completely.
C. If it is like that... Right.

Let's move to the main subject, though.

I have said that until recently,
the conditions were not met

—apart from the Greek World, where
Rigas Velestinlis [*] tells us

how democracy can be established without technology—

the conditions of a central parameter were not met, [and this parameter] is the communication system.

The members of a society need to be able to meet in order to function as a δῆμος. That is, institutionally in a society.

In the large states/countries today, then, this precondition was not met until the technology we know appeared.

The one we are using right now.

Exactly.

What does it mean? Let's be careful.

Today, there is not even one who mentions
the communication technology.

This is of great importance.

It is the information society, the society
of artificial intelligence...

Technology is targeted—and this is its ideological orientation—only to the priorities

that the current system raises,

so, we should not touch our value system—individual freedom—the political system—elective monarchy—

our economic system.

But it is as if we are saying that technology is coming to change the status quo... In other words,

The human who has a harmony in his body

to see his arm suddenly grow and become 10 meters [long],

but to think that the other members of the
body will not be influenced.

This is a deviation, not the rule.

So, what am I saying? That right now technology
has a primary and fundamental place

in the communication system, the analogous of which was, in the small scale of the πολις, the Pnyx.

That is the physical space communicate where they gather up.

What does Aristotle tell us, warning his student Alexander

when he goes to build the great state of
the Οἰκουμένη, the Cosmopolis?

Look after the city! Because in a large state, who will we find to have a voice like Stentor’s to be heard?

That is, so that the δῆμος, that is democracy,
can function, and so freedom too,

for which you went through so many struggles [*].

So here, the communication technology today has allowed the economic property to take over the world

—we mentioned this example before—because it uses the means of technology to move accordingly,

while they do not offer that to the societies, so that [technology] can constitute the δῆμος there.

In the future, the communcation technology will lead precisely to the constitituion at the level of the δῆμος.

That is, societies will be constituted institutionally to function within the political system at this level.

I have analyzed it since 1975.

S: Ok, we agree...
C: But note this.

We said that this will become necessary, now
the conditions have also been created.

It needs to be subject to the consequences
the doctrine of necessity.

That is, the economic pressure, so that Διεθνής των Αγορών be seeing, from up there where it moves, the societies

like ants and be stepping on them,

and for some people to think that they will transform their DNA so that they constantly have them as sheep,

and for them not to annoy and doubt.

Well, the dynamics of things is going elsewhere.

And the dynamics of things is saying that
we will be led there.

To the utilization of the communication technology

so that it can intervene internally in the
political system, as a partner.

However, for those who doubt this possibility, I have suggested the δῆμος of polls.

What does this mean?

The δῆμος of polls.

It means that, first of all, a public institution
should be in place

where the questions posited will not be those
of guidance and manipulation,

but on the big issues that should be decided.

Because, you know, the notion of representation cannot happen with what is called “referendums.”

The referendum is elective monarchy’s ferace [*].

It does not make the political system representative.

For the system to be representative, the
society should be a daily institution,

like the Parliament and the Government are.

So, by suggesting the δῆμος of polls, and in fact the passive [and] static form—I ask and get an answer—

or the creative [form], which takes initiatives—

I [i.e., we] have a specific capability:

To happen at the level of society that which
happens with a Minister and her advisors,

that which takes place with the Prime Minister and her Ministers and her advisors, etc.

That is, to give the data to the society...

We want military forces to match our possibility
or will to become a global power.

Or to defend ourselves an external enemy.

What do we need as weaponery?

And what capability do we have?

Towards this studies will take place, as they
happen and are given to the Minister,

and there 2-3 proposals will be formed.

What do we want?

To counteract with force?

To appease the enemy?

What should we do?

In this case, then, the society will be asked to decide.

The raison d'être of politics and economy is the society.

So...

If someone has the right to destroy himself, if someone has the primary right to decide, this is the society,

it is not the others.

I have said... I am saying this to give an example that it is possible, and not because this is the way it should be

in the future, or that this is how it will be.

I have talked about the δῆμος of polls to make them understand that if in important issues

they want decisions to be made, in consideration
of the society's will, there is a way.

We do not disagree in any of that.

The question I asked...

One last point, if you may.

One last point, if you may.

I carried out a study, based on these polls, which are manipulated, as you know.

They ask how handsome or tall the leader of the party to decide whether we like him or not,

and whether he has [the support of] the majority.

Not on specific issues.

Nevertheless, some interesting questions appear.

So, I carried out a 12-year study.

What does the society say, and what
political decisions were made?

If our politicians followed the proposals [and]
thoughts of the society

—who are uninformed, [it decides only] with its intuition and elementary knowledge—

we would not have ended up in the plundering of the country and the memorandums [*]; in bankruptcy.

You have mentioned this study in one of your talks, and I am quite interested in it, as well as others here in the U.S.

Please publish it.

It sounds extremely interesting.

Having the document in front of me, I have analyzed
it somewhere. It exists somewhere.

If we find it, it will be in the notes and references.

Another rough, if you will, assessment that is
concerned with the Greek affairs

of what happened during the Μεταπολίτευση [*].

I kindly asked a friend of mine who is an economist
and could gather the [relevant] data

to arrive at the conclusion: what wealth was created in Greece, flowed in from the European Union,

and how it was used.

Had it been invested productively,

Greece would be at the forefront of GDP, of the
wealth among the rest of the countries,

and it would not have reached its fall.

We understand, then, the plundering that happened.

One statistic that I think shows very clearly
that something is wrong is the following.

And I am not saying this with any national sentiment.

It is just a statistic which, if anything,
is bizarre and interesting.

There is a statistic that Ioannis Ioannidis, the
professor in Stanford, had put out [*].

According to it, Greece has a disproportional contribution to the global scientific stage.

Exactly.

That is, there are many more Greek scientists than they should be according to Greece’s population.

Thus, it is certain that there has been
a very bad investment.

But to return to my question, I take as a premise
what you said, the Δῆμος of Polls.

The question remains.

And this question is objective.

But we can see that depending on the phrasing,
the responses vary greatly.

In one case we have a 66% support, and in the other 30%.

In one case we have a 66% support, and in the other 30%.

And it is not easy to characterize one phrasing
as left-wing and the other as right-wing.

That is, it does seem to have a specific
ideological direction.

We can discuss the phrasing and its ideological direction at length, but I think we should be consumed there.

I think what is important is that, in general, it is very difficult to know what the will of the society is.

Because what is the society’s will in this case?

Is it the 66% or the 30%?

Do not get trapped by this.

Ask yourselves how many times a day, and not a month, the President of the United States changes his mind.

On major issues.

Isn't this so?

As a Greek politician said, when they told him “Wait, not long ago you were saying different things,”

he/she replied: “My thought developed.”

You can understand what this means.

What I am saying is...

You are saying that the Δῆμος of Polls will
not be worse than what we have today.

I agree with that.

Yes, that is one, but there is a second element.

The Δῆμος of Polls to which I am referring has a public character, with specific issues, which have to do

with specific policies, and in which the decisions will come after a briefing and a discussion.

Because now the polls come out...

Just as some call us and they ask us “Would you like to share your opinion on issue X?”

Well, have I been informed on this issue,
so that I can respond?

C: Did you understand?
S: Sure, yes.

Just like the example which mentioned each Minister.

Normally, what should she do?

They should bring her all the data which is
necessary to make a decision.

Along with proposals which she should assess.

And either correct them or proceed to make them a decision.

Or if there are more, to create their intersection.

This, then, leads us to an understanding of Δῆμος of Polls which installs itself within the decision-making process.

Where is preceded by a discussion session, and before that a briefing, on which we will be led to make a decision.

Then, the decision of the society will
be clear and specific.

It does not mean it will be correct, in the sense that it will be beneficial. It may be incorrect.

But as I told you, on the question of who
has the right to decide,

today they tell us that it is the President or the
Prime Minster with the Parliament.

Well, in democracy,

if we want to think under the terms of democracy on the question of who right to decide, then this is the δῆμος.

Because democracy always replies that your raison d'être, gentelemen of politics, is the society.

No American political class would exist if
if American society existed.

No Greek political class would exist
if no Greek society existed.

So, how come you decide on first and last degree, and without being subject to justice,

about that which concerns the whole society and its fates.

Sure, but I think that the reason this question is interesting, and the reason I picked it,

is that we cannot ascribe the difference
in the result to the lack of briefing.

The discussion could potentially help here. But since Δῆμος of Polls is the first step towards democracy...

If, say, it was the case that at first we gave them 0 information and we had the 66% result,

and then there was more information and we got 30%.

In that case perhaps we could say that the true will of the society is that after receiving some information.

But here the difference seems to be arbitrary.

I agree with you that even if the decision is arbitrary,

it is better to proceed with an arbitrary decision of the society than with a decision of the state.

It simply seems to me that there is a
deep structural problem,

which is that we cannot conclude what the society’s will is.

Nor what the correct method is
to extract that true will [*].

The majority rule is the precise, among those we know, way.

But what I am saying is that in one case we have 66% [i.e., a majority] and in the other 30% [i.e., not a majority],

based on how the society expressed itself.

Well, [this is about] polls that have not been through a discussion process, i.e., a political process.

Okay, we agree on that.

But this is a subsequent step [*].

Note this.

I will mention two examples.

One concerns, as Thucydides tells us, the decision of the Athenians to execute the πόλις of Mytilene [*].

Democratics and oligarchics, because it
defected from the alliance.

Today they decided this, and the next morning they woke up,

they had a new discussion session,
and overtook the other decision.

What did I say before? That democracy is not infallible.

But the one who is is allowed to make the mistakes is that who is the raison d'être of their existence.

The one who decides about the war, and will go to fight.

The one who decides about his fate, the society.

If the politician makes the mistake, then
she is accountable to the society.

If the society makes the mistake, then it is
not accountable to anyone.

Because [the society] is the only which
has the right to make mistakes

without asking anyone or giving account to anyone.

But the problem here is not...

Yes?

I am saying this to say that democracy, just like representation and monarchy, and analogously their

oligarchic versions, do not have to do with

the most correct, as Aristotle and
the others would tell us, πολίτευμα.

But rather with a dynamic evolution of things in which, one the one hand the economic property aims to take the lead,

and on the other hand the society to
play a part in the game,

and for it to also exist. That is, not to tolerate the curshing consequences of the other’s hegemony.

That is why the conflict is between hegemony and freedom, and this is how it appears in [the historic] time.

So, if we want to be specific and to end up somewhere,
one can find ways [i.e., solutions].

But the key for the future is this dynamic relationship which will lead societies to politics,

and in which the means—the vehicle—for the societies to be led to an established basis in politics

—so, to a transition of πολιτεία towards representation, and, in the far [future], democracy—

is the communication technology.

There is another reason.

What happened with slavery in antiquity
happens today with technology.

The rejection of labor. The transformation of labor to work.

Do you know what this means?

The the society of labor and the society of
economy are in agreement.

This is what promises the evolution.

It benefits greatly, and it will benefit greatly in the future, the company if the employee provides labor from home

compared to maintaining work spaces, taking part in the insurance of the employee, giving him a salary, etc.

On the other hand, the employee benefits from not being in a relationship of dependent labor, and being free

even if she works more.

But in the working hours she wants.

We are seeing this, then, along with the
other event of the rejection of work.

We will not have typists in the future, we will not have translators in the future, to stay within the context of our discussion,

to stay within the context of our discussion [*],

we will not have many jobs.

We will have only for manual work,
and that for limited [cases?]

What will happen to those who will exit
the economic process?

Will we [support them] with allowances, as some tell us?

No.

At first they will be satisfied with the allowances, but in the next phase, their appetite will increase,

because the nature of the desire is an abyss [*].

And when someone is poor, he is satisfied
when someone gives him a loaf of bread.

But when his appetite starts growing, then his desire becomes geometric [i.e., increases geometrically].

That is, if he has 20 euros, he will ask for 40 and not 21.

You talked about the dependent labor.

Would you like to talk about the society of σχόλη?

In your work, I have found two solutions on how
one can reject dependent labor.

And correct me if I'm wrong.

I am mentioning them so that you can analyze them.

(1) corporate guild and (2) political salary [*].

These are the two solutions I have found.

Tell us, if you want, a little a bit about this topics.

There is also a relevant book, Economic
Systems and Freedom [*].

What is not included today in Economic Theory
is the parameter of freedom.

They view it as operational.

They start from Durkheim, from Max Weber. [The latter] was surprised at some point because

he gave employees a raise to work more, and the more he gave them raises, the less they worked,

and they were looking forward to leaving to go consume [i.e., spend] those which he gave them more of.

And he considered this pre-modern, and not
capitalist, as he characterized it [*].

Yes, because it went against to what he
referred to as “the spirit of capitalism.”

It is productivity, and not freedom.

This, then, is of the premature era in which we live. It is outside the specifications of human nature,

which wants more and more free time.

Regardless this, the rejection of labor, and this process of transition to the society of σχόλη,

appears in classical democracy.

Tell us, if you may, what the society of σχόλη is.

The society of σχόλη is that the citizen does not take part in the economic process as a worker,

and especially with dependent work.

Hesiod tells us that in earlier times that
idleness was considered a shame.

Now labor is a shame [*].

The devaluation of dependent labor...

Sorry, but I think it is interesting.

Can we detect this in the etymology of the word? ἀσχολία [which in Greek means “occupation,” “work”] = α+σχόλη.

where the “α” is the ubiquitous privative prefix.

As you know, today Greek is the only language, because it has inherited the Ancient terminology,

which defines work/labor by negation.

Lack of σχόλη → ἀσχολία, or δουλεία → δουλειά [*],
dependent work.

Labor is many more things.

It is not only the three freedoms we mentioned,
and to add the fourth, the national,

the freedom of the social collective.

There are many other freedoms; areas of freedom.

In any case, the social devaluation of labor comes to Greek World when mass slavery [*] appears.

What is δουλεία primarily?

Well, there are the prisoners of war.

But mainly, when the inter-πολις trade gets developed,
there is a big trade of slavery from the barbaric countries

—the despotic [countries]—

to the πόλεις. The serf [*] there, who lives in poverty, prefers to come as a slave in Athens, from staying there.

So in Athens—in democracy—the principle of labor that was applied in his home place is applied there too;

that is, ownership.

But, many rights have been added to that,
I described them earlier.

Essentially, a slave in Classical Athens has more rights than a citizen—essentially a subject—has today

when it comes to work and the relationship with politics.

Can anyone conceive of a [citizen] filing a lawsuit against a politician because he hurt her, or the country? [*]

He will go to the Parliament and they will smile, and Members of Parliament

may even get a stroke out of laughter
because of her audacity.

But the slave had this right in πόλις of democracy.

So the greater the labor force of the slave—which at first does not have the necessary rights—

the more the citizen moves away from labor.

We know that circa 7th century B.C., they take measures against the entry of economic migrants, [against] slavery.

To protect the citizens’ labor.

Slowly this collapses; they do not have the capabilities to protect their borders at that time.

And of course, then, this expansion of slavery self-reproduces, pushing out the citizen as a result.

A big part of the responsibility [i.e., cause] of democracy comes exactly from the exit of the citizen from labor.

Because how will the worker participate in the redistribution of the economic product

who is now unemployed because the slave pushed him out?

And exactly here there is the second question.

How will the slave and the citizen
collaborate   the same job?

Won't the citizen feel that he is also a slave, without being a slave institutionally?

Now you see the value element.

Through this process we are led
towards two separate societies.

The political society—earlier we talked
about the society of the citizens—

not civil society, but the society that are citizens,

which is transformed within democracy
into a political society.

So, political society is the society benefits from its participation because it lives its life through politics,

if they are not entrepreneurs,

and on the other hand the economic society
of the slaves, which produces.

The society of σχόλη, then, has this dualism,
but concerns the citizen and not the slave.

S: May I ask: so that the citizen has the time...
C: The slave is the machine
S: Sorry, go on...
C: That which Aristotle thought about the future.

Today, then, the analogous... This is what I had already proposed back then, in 1975.

The analogous will be the communcation technology. That is, one will use robotics, or any other form of technology,

to satisfy needs at the level of labor which the
human will not satisfy.

Because in this way she will relieve herself from many burdens at the domain of labor, from salaries,

from insurance, from work spaces, etc.

I am giving the piece of information that this is
not a new [i.e., recent] issue.

At some point Agnelli—who owned the automotive factory in Italy [*]—invited a team of scientits,

of which I was a member.

And there one of his people explained to us that they were trying to train a species of apes to carry out

mechanical work to get rid of the Italian workers, who were creating problems because the were going on strike, etc.

Of course, this system failed, but consider
the thought projection he did.

For real.

This, then, is what technology brings to us today.

It does not mean, of course, that it will relieve us of everything. But, on a wide range of issues,

anyway the character of labor society will change,

and so also its class-based structure, its social preconditions and desires,

but a large part will go into idleness,
not unemployment; idleness [*].

Unemployment concerns those who are
candidates re-enter the economic labor.

The unemployment will be the opposite.
Meaning, they will be unnecessary.

And it is directly related to σχόλη, right?

This is the notion of σχόλη. We should keep in mind that σχόλη is not the right to laziness.

It is a way of living which transfers the citizen from the economic labor, and especially the dependent labor,

to political labor.

That is, just like today the politician is remunerated, so will the citizen who will govern the πόλις,

who will legislate and try, will be remunerated.

Aristotle does statistics as to how many thousands—around 35,000—of all citizens who were paid by the πόλις

obviously with political decisions made by the δῆμος.

That is, [the δῆμος] said: Am I providing you with the conditions to become rich? Go ahead and enjoy it.

[However,] I am entitled to a part of it, because I am out of [the work force], how am I going to live? These is how theaters were funded

—meaning, the cultural pleasure of the δῆμος—

this is how they lived with the salary by Ἐκκλησία;

He says: “we began with one obol [*], then we moved to two and then we reached three.”

The rich did not want this, of course, because they thought it was a requisition of their property.

Well, what can we do? Taxation is taxation.

May I ask something on this, because I think that...

However, let's go to the next phase.

When we enter [the period of] Οἰκουμένη with the League of Corinth, the requisition is banned,

that is, the political salary.

Do you want to have democracy? Go ahead, but
you won't receive a political salary.

And then, the application of the democratic principle was slowly adopted because the citizen did not want

to re-enter a process of economic dependency;
of deprivation of freedom.

The result was that corporate work began, which was completed towards the end of Rome,

and when we entered [the period of] Byzantium.

So, at that point there is no slavery, it stops.

It becomes useless, not through a court or political decision. It [simply] becomes useless.

And since slavery becomes useless,
everyone becomes a citizen.

And as citizens, they must work because
there is no political salary.

So, the democratic principle is applied. Meaning, [if] there are 50 or 100 of us who build houses, we unite and proceed.

[If] I have capital and a ship, then I get salaried [employees], but not in the sense of the salary,

but rather associates/partners; in percentages, damages and losses, and participation in the management of the ship.

This system of the corporate economy functions during the Ottoman rule in Greece, and is applied until the Greek state

abolishes it, but it is transmitted to the West—these are the popular guilds—

something which prevented the
rise of slavery after feudalism.

This is why slavery in the West developed between the colonies. Africa, America, etc.,

but not in the European continent.

Hmm, this is interesting. May I ask a...

That is, the Renaissance in the West happens thanks to the transfer from Byzantium of the πόλις,

and in the context of πόλις, [the transfer]
of the corporate economy; the guild.

It does have the democratic characteristics, of course,
but it prevented slavery.

Ok.

It was a house for the worker.

May I probe on two things I may not have understood well?

C: Please.
S: The first concerns the political salary. As you mentioned this involves a separation of the society

to a political society and a labor society.

And the persons in the political society are paid to participate in politics, but they do not work, right?

The citizens.

Nice.

Not everybody. That is, an entrepreneur who will go to the Ἐκκλησία need not get the salary, but she may.

Right, and I think this is where Aristotle pinpoints the benefit of the political salary.

That those who need the political salary the most are the lower classes, which also form the majority.

And so democracy happens organically.

Meaning, that the will of the many dominates,
and not of the few,

because it is the many who participate
in political actions, right?

Aristotle tells us: “Τὸ καλῶς σχολάζειν εἶναι προϋπόθεσις τοῦ καλῶς ἄρχειν.” [*]

And he justifies the political decisions of the
multitude, of the δῆμος,

that they are more correct than the political decisions of the few or the one, regarding the common interest.

But as we said, he determines that in that case too there is a problem due to the class-based formation of the society,

when the two ends dominate and there is no middle class.

Yes, and could you explain the next stage, the guild?

Using contemporary terms, I understand it as one share, and so one vote, for any participant in the production process.

And so there is no dependency relation.

For example, if ten programmers come together to see a project through, it is not the case that one is an employer

and the other an employee. Rather, each one has a share, and so one vote, and the profits are distributed equally.

Have I understood it correctly?

It is correct but I do not adopt the notion of the share because it admits many interpretations.

Sure, you may call it however you want,
I just used it for...

Yes, to [aid] understanding, sure. But note this. The Byzantines used to call it “a system.”

The Greeks in Ottoman Greece used to call it “company” [*].

The guild was introduced later so that one can communicate with the West, where it is [called] corporation. [*]

First all, we have many forms.

I have published [a book], already since 1982, in which I have included the analysis of this corporate phenonmenon

in the Ottoman Greece period, along
with πόλεις and democracy [*].

May I make a side note?

Democracy is not a matter of 1.5 century [i.e., the Golden Age] but [it starts from] 500 [B.C.]

[and ends] in the 19th century in the Greek World.

Just to clarify: you mean 500 B.C., right?

[Right,] B.C.

I recently published an analysis on the Constitution of Kalymnos;  of the sponge divers [*].

There, with the charter—meaning the Constitution—of Kalymnos, democracy comes up.

Democrancy in the sense of self-government, both in the economic and the political system.

In 1800, there is; I have published... We have very many, I have published many decisions.

In support of the fact that within
Ottoman Greece there are...

There are the πόλεις and the commons, and within the commons—sometimes oligarchically, others democratically—

the corporate economy dominates.

In any case, we have many forms of the corporate
economy, of companies, of guilds.

For example when only the labor
participates and not the capital.

Everyone is equal, and they decide as such.

They all own an equal part of the political system.

When the capital participates, the capital gain is computed differently with a quota related to labor,

but labor is also evaluated as capital.

And everyone participates proportionally in the management.

There are also corporate consolidations [i.e., unionizations]. For example, the bakers gather up

all together, so that they can draw raw
materials under better terms.

There is a guild of women soap makers in Larissa.
They produce soap.

There, they contribute with the raw materials.

There is Ampelakia which is a huge export power, where essentially the economic and political system are

in a common πολιτεία, [and] where every contributes depending on [their expertise].

[There is] the one who produces the raw material, the one who participates in the production of the fabric

in its coloring, etc., the one who participates in the exports, in the representation or somewhere else, etc.

But all together participate under equal terms in that which is the συμ-πολιτεία of Ampelakia's commons.

There is Mastichochoria, which is also a συμπολιτεία. There is Mademochoria in Chalkidiki [*].

That is, this is a polymorphism of this corporate organization of affairs.

It is not a single type.

Understood and very interesting.

But let's not forget that the Renaissance in the West happened using as a vehicle the πόλεις

—the commons transferred from Byzantium—and
the corporate economy.

This includes the French Revolution, and
then the so-called Paris Commune, etc.

Yes. Obviously you mean that this happened
both at the level of education,

but also at the level of culture and civilization that...

The Commons of the Ottoman Greece had developed an amazing educational system of cosmopolitan type.

The Constitution of Melnik, a Greek city that now belongs to Bulgaria, [located] close to tripoint with Skopje [*],

and the borders of Greece. I have published the Constitution in that book about the Commons in Ottoman Greece,

[and that Constitution] includes the social welfare, the πολιτεία of law, the self-government,

and the social welfare includes the management
of the Church by the crowd, the δῆμος.

Social welfare also includes taking care of the prisoners, who must have the vigil lamp so that they have lighting,

they must be warm, they must have good
food and nutrition, etc.

You know, since we are talking about this, in Byzantium the most brilliant healthcare and social system.

If you read the charters of the hospitals, you will be surprised. They are above those we have today.

I am not exaggerating.

I have published one of these, as an example, in the 6-volume work on the Byzantine system [*].

There, we have some aspects [i.e., articles]
that have to do with the mentally ill.

You know, in the West, the mentally ill
were considered demonized.

[However,] both in Byzantium and in Ottoman Greece, they were considered ill that needed the help of others.

Incredible [*].

Among these, the protection of illegitimate children [*] is included. Every δῆμος, every Common had a nursery.

That is, a reception where woman could go, if the child was illegitimate, instead of killing it, she could give it there

for the Common to raise it.

That is we have many names in Greece which have
Vrettos as a last name.

This is where it comes from. It is that [child] which was found and does have the father/family last name.

Amazing.

The anthropocentric world cultivates these,
in contrast to the feudalism/despotism,

which could not conceive [i.e., think] like that,
it had the Inquisition.

This, in lieu of an epilogue, if you wish, to the issues we discussed today. Because we had two routes [we could follow]

to make the transition to Modernity: (1) the Greek route, which was abolished, by decision, and (2) the West route,

which is the route of the periphery.

That is we started today to constitute ex nihilo the free human; that is, the human who has only individual freedom,

and elective monarchy as a whole.

Now we are moving to the next phase, in which the trasition to representation, and later democracy, is prepared through

is being prepared through the communication technology.

Yes, I think these some very optimistic predictions.

It is nice to hear such grounded predictions for the future that the technology can provide.

I am saying this because today there is a lot of scaremongering and fear for artificial intelligence.

I think that much of this fear, which we can locate in serious intellectuals, is rational.

And we should think and comtemplate
where we want technology to go.

But it is also good to have some well-founded
optimistic predictions.

C: In conclusion,
S: Sure.

The question of technology is not about technology, but who controls the technology.

Who sets the rules and controls the
direction and use of technology.

If technology is owned by the monarch, he will surveil us.

If technology is owned by the δῆμος,

then [technology] will not surveil us, because none of us will want to be under surveillance.

Therefore, as in all matters, technology of any form has to do with who controls it, who decides.

Today, [since] those who control [the technology] is the Διεθνής των Αγορών which has maneuvered the political staff,

the accumulation of wealth is scary.

What percentage, on a global scale, is owned
by a marginal percentage of persons,

and on every country too.

Isn’t this an anomaly which has to do, not with the system in itself, but what is the system and so who controls it.

This is what will happen with technology as a whole too.

Amen.

But actually, based on your work this is not a wish,
but a deterministic future.

I think that this approach [*] gives [i.e., shows] the imprint in terms of a proof

of the evolution of the world, i.e., [not] the biology that corresponds to the individual, but now to the societies.

This biology shows in an accurate way—I
would say, in another sense,

which I do not us to discuss of course, [it also shows] the time of the transition.

Because the more the world evolves anthropocentrically,

the more the time it takes for a change
[to take place] approaches zero.

It is not as in the despotic period when thousands of years were necessary to transition from one state to the next.

Here [i.e., now] the speed is blistering.

And in fact, the broadening—the expansion—in evolution,

from the level of freedom, to economy,
politics, and everything included.

And this is the new element that leads,
demonstratively, to the next era.

As long as—and we should always keep this in mind—

nature or the human hand do not cause
a catastrophe or a regression.

Obviously evolutionary biology does not rule that out. But if we continue—and I am sure we will continue,

and that we will not lead ourselves to destruction; we can see that with the sensitivities that are being developed

in the relationship of the human with nature. If this continues, then, we know where the world is going.

And the world is moving towards a transition of πολιτεία; towards representation, with a simulation in the beginning,

and later towards democracy.

Because solutions within the current
system cannot be given for society.

And the solution for this transition
of πολιτεία is technology.

That which the world of Modernity avoids to discuss: technology as an element of transition of the relationship

between the labor society and economy, on the one hand, and between society and economy, at the level of πολιτεία.

Technology will provide the solution; the terrain.

This is an interesting take on the densification of time.

Mr. Contogeorgis, thank you very much for joining us today. It was a very interesting discussion.

I would like to give you the stage one last time to share any thoughts you would like to leave the audience with.

I would say that what is happening today in societies—more so in the societies of novelty—is something that

should be thought again by those who play the role, first of intellectual, and then political leadership.

That is, to re-think the content of terms,
[and] the notion of science.

Social science[s] suffer from lagging behind, and
from an ideological charge.

We are thinking of the future of the 21st century using the terms of the 18th century.

With other terms that time did the the values ​that have been included in our thought were formed,

with other terms should we think today.

In other words, the Greek world, if treated as the corresponding [example] of the whole world today,

i.e., as an anthropocentric cosmosystem, it offers us a staggering new topicality at the level of science.

[I think we should] shape a new social science

which will allow us to know at which stage we are,
and where we are going. Apart from where we come from.

This will allow us to give the appropriate answers, instead of trying to serve—at the level of knowledge—

some at the expense of societies.

This is the central issue.

To form a new science, a new social science
that will also help the natural science

find its role in the developments that are coming, especially when it comes to communication technologies.

So the demand has been presented.

Thank you very much.

It was an honor for me, and I hope this discussion will help with the communication of your work

as it will be available with English subtitles.

These are then the closing words.

Thanks to everybody.

Thank you, congratulations for your work.

All the best.