According to Contogeorgis, this statement is inaccurate. More specifically, the phrase “to reach a better democracy” implies that currently we have democracy, which is false according to Contogeorgis.

I address Contogeorgis with “κύριε,” which can be translated as “Mr.” (and this is the translation I use), and so, in the English-speaking world can be taken as incredibly rude since he is a Professor. However, in Greece addressing someone as “Dr.” or “Professor” is rare and awkward. In K-12 and all the way through a doctorate, teachers and professors are addressed as “κύριε” (Mr.) and “κυρία” (Ms.). Note that all of: Mr., Lord, gentleman translate to “κύριος” in Greek. In the context of this discussion, the connotation of “κύριος” is communicated better with the English word “Sir,” but I use “Mr.” because “Sir Contogeorgis” sounds as if he has been knighted.

I should also note that Contogeorgis addressed me using the honorific plural throughout the whole episode (obviously so did I), an expression of respect for which I am grateful, especially given that the honorific plural is rarely used by senior people towards younger ones.

I did not say “You’re welcome.” There is a literal translation in Greek (είστε ευπρόσδεκτος) but it does not have the same connotation. I said “να ’στε καλά” which literally translates to “bless you” or “I wish you be well” (note the subjunctive in the latter).

Here is a short CV.

One may find more information on the interpretation of these terms in Law in the interpretation of Article 1 of the Greek Constitution here (unfortunately it is in Greek). One interesting statement is (my translation): “The Greek Constitutional Theory [...] interprets the relevant postulate regarding the nation [έθνος] as a metonymy of the true sovereign, that is, of The People [Λαός].”

Contogeorgis differentiates between “the nation” and “the people” at 00:25:09.

Here I made a mistake as I was trying to reach the conclusion about citizenship and the state. I meant to say that the nation (έθνος) and the people (λαός) are identical, not the nation and the state (κράτος). See previous comment.

The conclusion I make right after—that a citizen is a subject of the state—is true, and it is this which makes the definitions predicated on a state.

This question assumes that there is such thing as society, which is not a given. As Margaret Thatcher famously claimed: “There is no such thing as society” (see the 1987 interview for Woman’s Own).

The term “Science of Modernity” is a term Contogeorgis has coined, and I put in uppercase to signify that it is simply a proper name given to this field and endeavor (see Philosophy of Computer Science: An Introduction to the Issues and the Literature, William J. Rapaport, 2023, p.44, “Terminological Digression”). This is important because for Contogeorgis the Science of Modernity is not in fact a science (similar to how the West does not refer just to countries to the west; see The West: The History of an Idea). See 01:12:51.

One of the best analyses of how these interest groups function is Robert A. Dahl’s book A Preface to Democratic Theory.

This is a central notion in the work of Contogeorgis. We will explain it more as we go, but for now, we can say that anyone that is a “private body” means that it has the same status as any legal person, and thus it is not an institution in the political system.

The subject of the state is what we would call “a citizen” in our everyday language. But the whole point Contogeorgis tries to make here is that the way we currently understand the notion of the citizen is one of the many that are possible (“not singular”). Currently, our notion of the “citizen” presupposes the existence of a state of which this citizen is a subject, meaning it is under its authority.

Contogeorgis uses the phrase “τὰ τοῦ οἴκου μας” which literally translates to “those of our home.” It is an idiom that means “our own/our private affairs.” There is a famous phrase “τὰ ἐν οἴκῳ μὴ ἐν δήμῳ” which literally means “those of the home not in the δῆμος” and it means “private affairs should be shared publicly” (note that “δημό-σιος” translates to “public”).

I would be remiss if I did not cite the foundational work on nationalism: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism by Benedict Anderson.

Contogeorgis probably meant to say: “the expansiveness of the Kurdish state can be characterized nationalism, but not that of the Turkish state.”.

One interesting source is: Christopoulos, Marianna. “Greek Communities Abroad: Organization and Integration. A Case Study of Trieste,” 2007.

In 1751 there was a Decree of Privileges with which the authorities permitted the establishment of a self-governing Greek Orthodox confraternity with the right to elect its own priests (more information about this decree can be found here). Note that at the time the state religion was Catholicism. The Greeks requested to have children of inter-faith marriages raised in the Orthodox faith, but as M. Christopoulos writes: “Trieste’s Catholics found [this] proposal too much of a provocation. The Austrian authorities first made a counter-proposal that intermarriage be blessed by a Catholic priest and the child raised as a Catholic. However, this triggered such a strong reaction that it was omitted in the final version of the Decree of Privileges in 1751.” Importantly, she also says: “The very existence of such a request from the Greeks illustrates both the degree of tolerance of the host country and the Greeks’ sense of their own strength in Trieste.”

Finally: “The request to found a confraternity, whose members would be responsible for the election of its priests was accepted on condition that a representative of the Intendenza Commerciale (an Austrian administrative body) attend its official meetings. This condition indicates that the Community was to become a component part of the state administration.”

This claim—that the notion of society is not restricted to nations—is something Constantinos Tsatsos (a Greek philosopher and politician deeply influenced by German idealists) agrees with. He wrote a truly well-written monograph Πολιτική (translated as Politics by me), and he talks about that in Chapter 3, Section 4.

Unfortunately Πολιτική is not available in English. While Tsatsos does not stray far from the modern ideology which Contogeorgis denounces, there are some interesting points I want to touch upon (if I had to summarize Tsatsos’ project in Πολιτική, I would say that he attacks both historical materialism and Kantian idealism, which are normally on opposite sides). First, for Tsatsos claims that what constitutes a society (κοινωνία) is a common (κοινό) end (σκοπός) or meaning (νόημα); the two are identical for him. He then raises an important question: can societies be explained purely deterministically? According to Tsatos the answer is no because a common meaning cannot be explained deterministically. For this reason, societies are not natural phenomena. He then shows that Aristotle had the same opinion, citing Politics, 1252b.30, where Aristotle says that a society (κοινωνία) is created for the sake of life (ζῆν) but it exists for the good life (εὐ ζῆν).

The line of thinking that Contogeorgis follows starting at 00:37:05 and ending at 00:38:02 can be a little confusing. I will try to interpret it and explain it.

First of all, Contogeorgis distinguishes between: (a) the political system in the narrow sense, and (b) the political system as it is considered today. (a) contains only the strictly political institutions. For example in Greece, it includes only the government and the parliament. On the other hand, (b)—according to Contogeorgis—contains also everything (else) that is currently under the control of the state: justice, public administration, law enforcement, military, etc.

At 00:37:49, Contogeorgis claims that according to contemporary Political Philosophy, all these that (b) contains belong to the state as a natural “ιδιώνυμο.” We need to examine this term—ιδιώνυμο—carefully. Literally, it means “that with its own special name” (ιδιώ-νυμο). But it has a special meaning in Greek Law: it refers to a special crime, that has a distinct place in the Penal Code (in Latin we could translate it as “delictum sui generis”). The term was introduced in Greek legal affairs in 1929 with the law 4229/24. The goal of this law was to criminalize, and thus suppress, revolutionary or subversive ideas which could lead to a violent overthrow of the government, with a special focus on Communism, Anarchism, and trade-union movements.

According to this definition, claiming that (b) should belong to the state cannot be an ιδιώνυμο (natural or otherwise) since that is the conventional wisdom. I think Contogeorgis meant to say that claiming the opposite—that everything in (b) should not belong to the state, which is what he supports—is an ιδιώνυμο.

See comment at 00:24:47.

What Contogeorgis says is true, but the story is much more complex in practice. Indeed, in most states—Greece and the U.S. included—citizens do not have a right to veto, redirect, or block how the government chooses to spend taxpayer money. Nevertheless, no state wants to cause friction with taxpayers, because that causes dissidence, which in general no state wants to deal with. At the same time, states want to do many things taxpayers disagree with, so a mantra like “make sure citizens agree with what you do” is not enough to both prevent dissidence and let you do what you want.

The trick, then, has to be more elaborate. In the U.S. it rests on convincing the citizen that she cannot understand, and in fact, must not understand how the money is used. The key to achieving that is “national security.” I put it quotes because the practices have virtually nothing to do with national security, but that is how they are publicized. You see, the trick with national security is the circular scheme in which anything involved in national security has to be classified and secret for reasons of... national security.

So, say that the state wants to spend money to help Big Business develop new technology—because there is no such thing as a “free market” in the U.S. Any successful economy, the U.S. included (but also e.g., Singapore), has historically succeeded only through protectionism, state regulation, and state support, especially during the initial and riskiest steps toward a product. But of course most states know that most taxpayers will not be happy with spending money e.g., in developing the next Boeings, so the state will not come out and say “we are spending your money there.” Instead, they launch “national-security” programs—even though historically such programs included the development of products which at least at the time had nothing to do with national security, like microchips—in which Big Business becomes a contractor and the state buys the products (again, to support the “free market,” which if it wasn’t for the state footing the bills in the initial steps, it would crumble into itself). Because this is “national security,” the state implicitly or explicitly tells its subjects that “you cannot understand the high-tech that is involved, and even if you could, you should not know for security reasons.” Now again, if you ask the actual scientists who work on these things, they will tell you that there is no national-security risk in leaking these things. Classified documents around technology are kept classified under the veil of “national security” to keep the U.S. citizens from learning about them, and not the Soviet Union (back then) or China (today). Through an arms race (which always needs an enemy), then, the state can mostly do whatever it wants with the money without creating dissidence.

Now, I should make clear that I didn’t say anything new. For example, Chomsky has described these processes pretty clearly in Understanding Power since at least 2002. And he himself did not come up with these ideas; he was basically quoting declassified U.S. documents. So, for most U.S. citizens this is not anything new, but it seems it is important to keep in mind in this discussion.

Contogeorgis used the term “κατ’ αρχήν” which technically means “in principle” (αρχήν is the accusative of αρχή = principle). However, there has been a language change in recent years where “κατ’ αρχήν” is confused with “κατ’ αρχάς” which means “first of all, firstly.” In fact, very few people use “κατ’ αρχήν” according to its etymology (similar to how X-phobia does not always mean “fear of X”), and one usually has to guess from the context. In this case, it is clear that Contogeorgis meant to say “first of all.”

Contogeorgis used the term “δικαστική αντίληψη,” which we could translate as “judicial perception.” However, this term has been deprecated in Greek legalese; the more up-to-date term is “δικαστική συμπαράσταση,” which translates to “judicial support.” However, this term is not in use in e.g., U.S. law, and instead a more “American” term is the term “judicial interdiction.” Contogeorgis explains what he means by the term he used, but you can read more about what judicial interdiction is in this document provided by the State of Louisiana (for the purposes of this discussion—whose goal is not to clarify, and does not depend on, fine differences of the two legal systems—these two terms could be considered equal).

We should not forget here what the highly influential Walter Lippmann was advocating for: “The public must be put in its place, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd.” And also (my emphasis): “The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic [...] In the absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against selfcentered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality.” That “specialized class” is also known as oligarchy.

Besides, “autonomy” comes from “αὐτός”—meaning “self”—and “νόμος”—meaning “law.”

One of the many videos where Castoriades said this is in this interview (at 1:35)

Locke writes in the Second Treatise of Government (Section 85): “[A] Free-man makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive. And though this commonly puts him into the Family of his Master, and under the ordinary Discipline thereof; yet it gives the Master but a Temporary Power over him, and no greater, than what is contained in the Contract between ’em.” Then he goes on to distinguish the Slave from the Servant. This is a distinction that Contogeorgis also makes in his work. He explains the distinction at 01:28:10. I translate “δουλεία” as “slavery” and “ὤνια ἐργασία” as “work for sale” (what Locke would probably call “servitude”). Nevertheless, note that Contogeorgis many times uses them interchangeably (in Greek).

Monarchy, oligarchy, democracy.

For the definition of “anthropocentricism” see the introduction.

Ovid was a Roman poet whose most famous work is Metamorphoses. As the title suggests, the book talks about the transformation (μεταμόρφωσις) of people and things, some of which are radical. So, when we talk about “ovidian changes,” we mean that the changes are huge.

You can find a version of this research this link: Political Culture in Greece, but it does not seem to contain the tables.

Contogeorgis has introduced Cosmosystemic Gnoseology, which I explain in the introduction.

Regarding the evolution of societies, it is interesting to remind us Kant’s words in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (translated by H. B. Nisbet): “Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will’s manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws [...] History is concerned with giving an account of these phenomena [...] and it allows us to hope that, if it examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions.” In other words, Kant proposed the phenomenal idea that even if there is individual Free Will, societies as a whole follow a specified trajectory. For Kant, societies back then were still in an intermediate stage, not having reached their complete moral culture.

Benjamin Constant was very influential to the Western philosophical thought. Kant quotes him in On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy and John Rawls cites him on page two of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.

See comment at 00:18:28.

This refers to the subject of the movement called Transhumanism. (As far as I know,) It has no connection to the T in LGBTQ.

Democracy as Freedom is my translation of the Greek book Δημοκρατία ως Ελευθερία, which I showed right after. Unfortunately, there is no English translation of this book, but there is a French edition. Beware though that this may be an abridged version as the page count is less than half.

Aristotle writes in Politics, 1253b.33: “εἰ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον [...] οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων.” My translation: “If it was possible for each of the tools to order, or to feel/understand in advance, [the tool’s] own work to its [i.e., the work’s] end [...] neither would the chief artists need their servants, nor masters their slaves.”

See comment at 01:03:55.

Contegeorgis used the word “ἑταιρικό.” In the modern world, this word has come to mean “corporate” (and that is what it means in Modern Greek). However, when Contogeorgis talks about a “ἑταιρικὸ economic system,” he does not mean a “corporate economic system,” i.e., Big Business, etc. He talks about an economic system in which associations between equals are formed instead of dependencies (that was partly the idea of corporate systems as envisioned by the Dutch). A modern corporation resembles such an association (in which the members are “partners” or “associates”), but it is not exactly the same because today there is no limit to how many stocks a single associate can have. Thus, there can exist a dependence relationship. See the discussion between Contogeorgis and me that follows.

The phrase that I translated to “blessing” is “ευχής έργο(ν).” Its literal translation is “the work of a wish.” It is used to refer to something we wish would happen. So, in English it can be translated as “desirable.” However, clearly Contogeorgis did not imply this meaning: the fact that they are Greek is… a fact. As such, it is not desirable or something we wish, but something that is already true. This points us to the fact that this phrase is sometimes used with an alternative meaning: the result (i.e., “work”) of a wish. i.e., a blessing. I do not think you will find this in a dictionary, but linguistically it is not wrong. The genitive (here “ευχής” → “ευχή’s”) is commonly used to refer to something someone did. For example “έργο τέχνης” (or, to match the structure above even though it is not idiomatic: “τέχνης έργο(ν)”) translates to “work of art,” i.e., a work that was the result of art, not something that may/will be the result of art.

Sotiris is the guest of the next episode!

This was recorded in June 2025. In February 2026 Theofanis Tasis became an Assistant Professor in Ionian University.

Contegeorgis used the Greek “παίρνω είδηση,” whose literal translation is “I take news.” It means to notice something. The fact that I did not “παίρνω είδηση” someone does not mean that she moved surreptitiously.

There is no official translation of this book to English, but there is a translation here (part of a big undertaking to translate Kondylis’ work). The book was originally published in German (in which Kondylis wrote most of his work) as Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensformen and was translated to Greek by Kondylis himself (with a special introduction by him) with the title Η Παρακμή του Αστικού Πολιτισμού. Unfortunately Kondylis died very young.

See comment at 03:29:52.

This is one case where “εξουσία” is translated as “power” (because “separation of powers” is translated to Greek as “διάκριση των εξουσιών”).

Regarding the translation “criminal litigation.” Contogeorgis used the “παραβατική προσφυγή στην δικαιοσύνη.” To the best of my knowledge, there is no good translation (anyway the Greek does not correspond to a standard term in the Greek legal system), but “criminal litigation” is close enough.

In 2.65.3 of Thucydides’ Histories, using Rex Warner’s translation: “In fact, the general ill feeling against Pericles persisted, and was not satisfied until they had condemned him to pay a fine. Not long afterwards, however, as is the way with crowds, they re-elected him to the generalship and put all their affairs into his hands.” Also see 1.135 for a similar situation with Themistocles.

Aristotle in Politics, Book 2, 1274a.16 (using Hippocrates G. Apostle’s translation): “Solon, at any rate, seems to have given the common people the most needed power to elect officials [τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι] and hold them accountable [εὐθύνειν], since without such authority they would be slaves and hostile to the πολιτεία”. Note that “αἱρεῖσθαι” is a synonym of “ἐκλέγειν,” which Contogeorgis uses.

Furthermore, in Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία (usually translated as “Athenian Constitution” or “The Constitution of Athens”), Part VII, using Rackham’s translation: “And he [i.e., Solon] established a constitution and made other laws [...] They wrote up the laws on the Boards [...] and all swore to observe them; and the Nine Archons used to make affirmation on oath at the Stone that if they transgressed any one of the laws they would dedicate a gold statue of a man.” So, again, they were held accountable and they faced penalties if they went against the laws.

Finally, in 1281b.33: “It is for this reason that Solon and certain other lawgivers give them [i.e., the people] power of electing officials of the state and holding these accountable[.]”

The word “εὐθύνειν” is an infinitive which comes from “εὐθύνη,” which can be loosely translated as “responsibility.” The point of “εὐθύνειν” is that the bearer of a mandate is held accountable for his decisions and actions. As Contogeorgis explains, this meant back then that he is subject to justice for political offences, and that any citizen could—as we would say today—prosecute/sue a politician.

This is reminiscent of Rousseau’s distinction between the will of all (volonté de tous) and the general will (volonté générale). See Book 2, Chapter 3 in Du Contrat Social.

Contogeorgis used the phrase “ελεύθερη εντολή,” a literal translation of which would be “free mandate.” However, this would not convey the intended meaning of the phrase, which in English is given by the phrases “blank check,” or “free hand,” or “free rein.” Basically, by “ελεύθερη εντολή” Contogeorgis means (as he explains immediately afterwards): the freedom to do things and make decisions without being controlled or checked.

This continues from the note above. Contogeorgis used the phrase “ἐν λευκῷ ἐξουσιοδότησι,” which would literally translate to “authorization in white.” Of course this makes no sense in English. It means blank check. The phrase is a direct loan from the French “carte blanche” which literally means “white card” but has the same figurative meaning.

It is interesting to consider a comment by the Law Professor Apostolos Georgiadis, who belongs to what we could refer to as the conventional school of thought (i.e., what Contogeorgis argues against). In his book [WIL], Part 2, §24.II.2, p. 258, he writes: “Article 51 of the Constitution defines that Members of Parliament represent the Nation. However, the Member of Parliament bears no resemblance to the representative or bearer of a mandate [i.e., an agent] of private law. This is because the representative (e.g., the person to whom I assign the job of selling one of my apartments instead of me [i.e., on my behalf]) is bound by the instructions of the person who is represented. In contrast, the Members of Parliament have, according to the Constitution, a boundless right of opinion and vote in conscience.”

It is interesting to see what Rousseau, one of the “moderns,” says about representation. The following is an excerpt of Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social, Book III, Chapter 15, using John T. Scott’s translation: “Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated. It consists of its essence in the general will, and the will cannot be represented. Either it is the same or it is different—there is no middle ground. The people’s deputies therefore are not, nor can they be, its representatives. [...] The idea of representatives is modern. It comes to us from feudal government—from that iniquitous and absurd government in which the human species is degraded and in which the name of man is dishonored. Among the ancient republics and even among monarchies, never did the people have representatives. That very word was unknown. [...] Among the Greeks, everything the people had to do it did by itself. It was constantly assembled in the public square [...] [S]laves did its work, its chief business was its freedom [see our discussion on σχόλη] [...] [T]he moment a people gives itself representatives, it is no longer free. It no longer exists.”

Contogeorgis refers to the president of the parliament, who is not the prime minister. That person has a mostly administrative role.

Γεωργιάδης (Georgiadis) in [WIL], Part 2, §24.I.2, p. 256, mentions that (my emphasis): “The rule is that [for a decision of the Parliament] an absolute majority is required, which, however, cannot be less than 1/4th of the total number of members (75). Still, this last condition is often not followed in practice because in most sessions of the Parliament only few members are present.” This rule is not “just a rule” or a convention. Rather, it is stipulated in Article 67 of the Constitution (and yet it is ignored).

Contogeorgis uses the word “ένδυμα,” which literally means “garment” or “article of clothing.” The usage here is figurative, though. He refers to different roles.

Contogeorgis uses the word “αμπέχονο.” There is no good translation for that. It generally refers to a military top, like a jacket. Here is an example of an αμπέχονο from the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle.

Contogeorgis here uses the passive voice whereas I used the passive for the verb “restore.” Here is the original sentence: “Γιατί ακριβώς μόνο μέσω της πολιτικής μπορεί να αποκατασταθεί η ισορροπία που είχε κατά μέρος επιτευχθή …” The italics denote the passive, which I turned to “can we restore …” I did that because it is much more comprehensible. In English it is quite hard to translate this passive voice accurately into a readable sentence. It would turn out something like this: “... exactly because only through politics can the balance that had been partially achieved within states in the past be restored,” i.e., with a huge middle clause between the verb and the subject.

I think Contogeorgis means more power but he used the word “δυνατότητα” so a more literal translation is “potential.”

Here is Apostle’s translation of the full passage: “for what is just is thought to be what is equal, what is equal [is thought to be] the multitude’s opinion, which has authority, and so what is free and equal [is thought to be] whatever one wishes to do.” Note that Apostle translate “κύριον” as authority, which I intentionally did not. Obviously nobody should take seriously a translation I came up with live on a recording, although I tried to translate to English what I said in Greek as faithfully as possible for transparency.

I actually never recited Apostle’s comment. I will include it here for completeness, although thankfully it was not pivotal to the discussion. This is comment number 6 on Book E, Section 9. In my edition, the comment is on page 335: “The statement ‘what is free and equal is whatever one wishes to do,’ of course, does not follow from the premises; for if the majority is the authority, the minority will not be able to do what they wish, and so they will not be free and equal.” I think what Contogeorgis would reply with here is that there is no authority. In other words, the majority is not a long-term body, but rather the majority changes from one vote to the other, and from one matter to the other. Later, though, I mention a problem that can come up even with the absence of a body of authority.

The colloquial phrase I used has no translation. I said “να ξεστραβωθώ,” a literal translation of which could be: “to unblind myself.” Figuratively, it can mean “to understand better,” “to resolve my confusion,” “to erase misunderstandings,” etc.

It is unclear whether Contogeorgis meant “η μετάφραση έχασε το αρχαίο κείμενο,” or “το κείμενο της μετάφρασης έχασε.” The distinction is interesting only to people who care about the linguistic difference in Greek. In both cases, the point is that if a translation translated “ἀρχή” as “authority,” it would be a bad translation.

Indeed, Apostle translates it mostly as “government” and sometimes as “democracy.” Jules Tricot (who used to be the golden standard in French) translates “πολιτεία” as “gouvernement constitutionnel, légal,” and he cites these passages: I, 1, 1252a 15 ; III, 6, 1278b 10 ; 7, 1279a 39. The second one is particularly interesting: “ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα [10] τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία.” The last sentence, according to him, justifies that he translates “πολίτευμα” as “gouvernement, le «souverain».” See comment at 02:16:19.

A more literal translation would be “it is for the garbage,” but that is much less idiomatic. For what it’s worth, in my opinion the phrase Contogeorgis used (είναι για πέταμα) is less vulgar in Greek than the phrase “it is garbage” is in English.

What I meant here is that it is not perfect, or even “good enough for serious study without consulting the original.” I do not think it is garbage because it is, in my opinion, the best we have in English.

Translating “πολιτεία” as government is an important misunderstanding, which is why Contogeorgis got triggered. The confusion may have arisen because in the “direct” definitions of “πολιτεία” (like the one in 1278b.9) Aristotle may seem to imply, looking it through the eyes of modernity, that a “πολιτεία” is some kind of body separate from the rest of society. However, we can clearly see this is not the case if we read his work carefully. Beginning with 1289b.28 (Politics, Book Δ, 3), Aristotle (in this note I am using Hippocrates G. Apostle’s translation, except for certain terms that I preserve in Greek): “The reason why there are so many kinds of πολιτεία is the fact that every πόλις has many [different] parts.” Aristotle goes on to explain that these can be, among others, different kinds of households, people engaged in trading, and artisans. And then in 1290β.3 he writes “for in that treatment we enumerated the number of parts which every such πόλις must have, and sometimes all those parts partake of πολιτεία, sometimes few, and sometimes a greater number.” In a government today an artisan, a household, and someone engaged in trading would not be part of the government. However, for Aristotle they were, which is why Contogeorgis says that a “πολιτεία” encompasses the whole socioeconomic and political system.

The same can be deduced about the term from the scenes described by Thucydides since the δῆμος takes part in all aspects of decision making. That is, it has as Contogeorgis puts it, individual, social, and political freedom. More specifically, we should be quite careful when we interpret Thucydides’ writing. For example, in 1.127 he writes “διότι [Pericles] ων δυνατώτατος πάντων των άλλων και διοικών την πολιτείαν.” This can be translated as: “as Pericles was the most powerful of everyone else and managing the πολιτεία” as “διοικῶ/διοικέω” can be translated as “govern, manage, exercise authority.” From that we could conclude that Pericles was akin to a modern-day President of the United States, but as we now know from the note in 01:46:23, this is far from the truth. Pericles was fined the δῆμος!

The term “cosmohistoric” does not exist in English, but it is the literal translation. It means “pertaining to world history.” A literal translation in German is “weltgeschichtlich.”

Here a deeper analysis of slaves and women is pertinent. First of all, let us talk about women. It is clear that even enlightened minds like Aristotle were misogynists, as we would call them today (although I do not like the term because it derives from μίσος (hatred), but there is a big distance between prejudice and hatred—it is a whole spectrum—and using the same term for the whole spectrum leads to imprecise discourse). For example, Aristotle writes in Politics 1.1260a11‑13 that “the female has the [βουλευτικόν = deliberative authority] but it lacks authority [ἀλλ’ ἄκυρον].” Which is to say that she needs the authority of a male.

Nevertheless, to judge Aristotle’s morals by today’s standards is a clear case of presentism. In fact, Athens of that time was more progressive in many was than even today’s socities. For example, adjectives in Greek have a gender (like in French). For instance, a Greek woman is referred to as “ελληνίδα” whereas a Greek man is referred to as “έλληνας.” Many adjectives, however, do not have a feminine version, especially when it comes to jobs, because these positions have until recently been held only by men. Many people, primarily women, have been trying to introduce such feminine versions into our language, but they face reactionary waves. Well, Ancient Greeks already had “πολίτης,” which the masculine of “citizen,” but also “πολίτις” (notice the ending ι), which is the feminine version. Aristotle uses it multiple times throughout Politics! Yet today, in my experience, we Greeks still use rarely, if ever, the feminine (and for some reason it seems people use “πολίτισσα” and not the Ancient Greek “πολίτιδα”).

Where did Aristotle talk about πολίτιδες? In describing citizenship. Aristotle in Politics 3.1275b23 tells us that a child is a citizen if and only if both of its parents are citizens, and he in fact explicitly lists both the masculine and the feminine. In 1278a.27 he even tells us that in some democracies, a child is a citizen even if only its mother is a citizen. Further, many women were in a position to influence men, like Ἀσπασία who influenced Εὐριπίδης. That is to say, while Ancient Athens was far from a paradise for women, nevertheless they were not nobodies.

When it comes to slaves, they usually did not contribute to wars, and if they did, they were not on the first line. Now compare this with the modern-day U.S. “volunteer army,” which is basically a mercenary army of systematically pauperized and segregated citizens—mostly black people whose officers are white. Moreover, slaves in Ancient Athens were afforded all the other kinds of perks we discuss in the rest of the video (e.g., one became a rich banker and bought his slavery, they could sue politicians, etc.).

So, if we want to judge Ancient Athens by the then standards, then really the most unfair treatment was that of the metics (μέτοικοι), i.e., immigrants. These had the same obligations as citizens (e.g., they did go to the first line of war), but they never became citizens (this comment was heavily inspired by this episode).

This is from the New Testament, Pauline Epistle to the Ephesians, 5.33. It is very famous in Greece (e.g., a movie with that title appeared many years ago) as it is recited during the Mystery of Crowning. The tradition is that the bride steps on the groom’s foot to show that she is not afraid of him.

The verb is still used widely in Modern Greek (e.g., “I am afraid of spiders” → “Φοβάμαι τις αράχνες”) and it means “to be afraid of.” It is never used to mean “respect.” In fact it is the same exact verb, except that the “η” in “φοβῆται” is a characteristic, lost in the last 40 years, of the subjunctive.

Actually there are some English translations that say “be afraid of,” but the most popular/used ones say “respect.” I do not know of a Modern Greek translation that says “afraid of.” It is interesting that a couple of lines later, 6:5, “φόβος” is translated as “fear” in my Modern Greek translation.

Epistle to Ephesians 5:31.

As most people who read bilingual texts know, usually the original text is on the left. Also, some translations have the original and translated texts aligned, which is particularly useful.

See comment at 02:13:32.

Aristotle says in 1290a.30 (Hippocrates G. Apostle’s translation): “One should not posit, as some thinkers usually do nowadays without adding qualifications, that people’s rule [δημοκρατία] is a government in which the multitude [πλῆθος] have the authority [κύριον]; for even in oligarchies and everywhere the larger part of the state [may be] the authority [κύριον] [...] For if a state were to have 1300 members, and if 1000 of them were to be wealthy and these would not give a share in ruling to the other 300 members, who are poor and free and in other respects similar, no one would say that these 300 are ruled in a people’s rule [δημοκρατεῖσθαι τούτους].”

In my opinion it is more well-defined, but the main reason I used it in this case is because its meaning is more appropriate.

Be careful. Contogeorgis tries to explain what was happening back then, but using as examples contemporary institutions and the present tense. Essentially, he tries to explain how contemporary institutions would be structured if they followed the principles that were followed back then.

We should be careful here. Contogeorgis uses the word “φυλή” which could be translated as “race,” and it has been translated as such, but “γένος” is translated as “race” in many translations causing massive confusions. In Modern Greek translating φυλή with “race” would be correct, but in Ancient Greece the term had a different meaning. Α φυλή in Ancient Greece was not a categorization of people based on shared physical characteristics (as most understand it today). Rather, a φυλή was a structure of political organization (it is actually hard to give a clear definition of what a φυλή was). In Ancient Athens, the φυλαί were essentially different municipalities in Attica which participated in common politics to achieve certain goals. One may think that a φυλή was defined purely based on geographical location, but that is also not true. More specifically, with the reforms of Cleisthenes, people from the same φυλή were distributed across 3 location (groups). Finally, the number and composition of φυλαί changed over the years with φυλαί being added and removed throughout history. You can find one of the best treatments of this subject in the relatively short book The Political Organization of Attica by John S. Traill. It is clear that Contogeorgis uses the term φυλή the way Ancient Greeks used it because right after he uses the word “δῆμος.”

“Social moderation” is my translation of “κοινωνικὴ μεσότης.” To the best of my knowledge, Aristotle never used this exact term, but he made the case for social moderation, which basically means that there should not be an excess of one class/tribe/group/… over another in political life. In Politics, 1295a.36 (using Hippocrates G. Apostle’s translation; my emphasis): “For if what we said in our Ethics is well-stated (namely, that the happy life is the life according to virtue and free from impediments, and that virtue is a mean between extremes) [...] [T]he same definitions must apply also to the virtue and vice of [πόλεις] and of [πολιτείας].” Then Aristotle proceeds to make a long argument in favour of the middle class and its role in a πολιτεία.

The term Contogeorgis used is “θητική τάξη.” This class, the class of “thetes/θῆτες” (possibly from the verb τίθημι → posit, place), were the lowest social class in Solon’s time.

In Politics, 1274a.22: “while the fourth class, the Thetes, were admitted to no office.” Also in Athenian Constitution, Ch. 7, Sec. 3: “[T]hose who were rated in the [θητικὸν] class he admitted to the membership of the assembly and law-courts only.”

(Pseudo-)Xenophon in his Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία describes this class in great detail, even though he never uses this name for them (but he describes the lowest class). Also see 2:17:42, where Contogeorgis refers to that class as “the proletariat of that period.”

To the best of my knowledge, no such statement has been made by Demosthenes. In fact, Demosthenes was the one who criticized those that today we would call populists. For example, in Third Philippic, Section 2: “[Athenians, you are in this dismal state] above all due to those who study to win your favour rather than to give you the best advice.”

Just to be clear, the Founding Fathers were openly and unabashedly against democracy (or at least what they understood as democracy). James Madison in particular, did not like it at all. He writes in the Fedralist Papers:

• Federalist 10: “A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place [...] The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest[.]” (note that this is elected oligarchy).
• Federalist 14: “[I]n a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents.” And later he mentions the then limitation of democracy: “A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.”

You see, Madison was even more clear than Lippmann (see comment at 00:45:41) why he believed a selected few should govern. Lippmann essentially argued that only a selected few, “specialized class,” can govern with competence. For Madison, it was simply because the selected few are the proprietors. He wrote: “An obvious and permanent division of every people is into owners of the Soil, and the other inhabitants. In a certain sense, the Country may be said to belong to the former [...].” And: “Landholders ought to have a share in the government [...] They ought to be so constituted as to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority. The Senate, therefore, ought to be this body” (the quotes are taken from footnote 96, Chapter Eight, in Understanding Power).

But John Madison was not the only one who did not believe in democracy. John Adams writes in Letter to John Taylor, 2: “Democracy: Sovereignty in the many; i.e. in the whole Nation; the whole Body [...]. This Sovereignty must in all cases be exerted, or exercised by the whole People assembled together. This Form of Government has Seldom if ever existed, but in Theory. As rarely at least as an Unlimited Despotism in one Individual.”

Montesquieu too would not call what we have today a democracy. In the De l’esprit des lois he wrote: “Le suffrage par le sort est de la nature de la démocratie ; le suffrage par choix est de celle de l’aristocratie.” My translation: “Voting by lot is the nature of democracy; voting by choice [i.e., electing] is that of aristocracy.”

Of course, at the same time, he also wrote: “Le grand avantage des représentants, c’est qu’ils sont capables de discuter les affaires. Le peuple n’y est point du tout propre; ce qui forme un des grands inconvénients de la démocratie” → “The great advantage of representatives is that they are capable of discussing affairs. The people are not at all suited to this; which is one of the great disadvantages of democracy.”

And “Tous les citoyens, dans les divers districts, doivent avoir droit de donner leur voix pour choisir le représentant; excepté ceux qui sont dans un tel état de bassesse, qu’ils sont réputés n’avoir point de volonté propre.” → “All citizens, in the various districts, must have the right to cast their vote to choose the representative; except those who are in such a state of lowliness that they are considered to have no will of their own.”

The word “πολλά” in the literal sense means “many.” I do not think there is a precise and concise way to translate it. Essentially, Contogeorgis claims that Aristotle accepts pluralism in a society.

One should be cognizant of the fine shades with which the term “sovereignty” has been used in political texts. For example, the way Contogeorgis uses the word “sovereignty” and also “subject of sovereignty” aligns more closely with the way Hobbes used it: “One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for thier Peace and Common Defence. And the that carryeth this Person, is called Soveraigne, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his Subject” (Leviathan, end of Chap. XVII). In my reading, this definition does not agree with the way Rousseau used the word.

He is referring to the League of Corinth.

I could not find any such evidence. In fact, in the book The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix writes: “But men may require no bribes to induce them to pursue courses that are anyway congenial to them [...] [E]ven at Athens there were a number of rich and influential citizens who needed no persuasion to support Philip [...] [While] Philip could expect support in Greece from the oligarchically-inclined only, Markle demonstrates admirably why men [rich men] were prepared to accept Philip’s hegemony over Greece: the king could be expected to support the propertied classes and to favour a regime of a more ‘hierarchical and authoritarian’ type than existed in democratic Athens. [...] And indeed the League of Corinth [...] explicitly guaranteed the existing social order: city constitutions were ‘frozen’, and there was an express prohibition of the redistribution offland, the cancellation of debts, the confiscation of property, and the freeing of slaves with a view to revolution (Ps.-Dem. XVIl.15).” The last reference is to Demosthenes’ Oration 17, On the Treaty with Alexander, Section 15.

Referring to the Liturgy, which was “a public service established by the [πόλις] whereby its richest members (whether citizens or resident aliens), more or less voluntarily, financed the [πολιτεία] with their personal wealth.”

The translation “with full sails” corresponds to the word “πλησίστιος.” It comes from “πλήρης” (full, complete) and “ἰστίον” (sail). It also has a metaphorical sense, which means “in full speed.”

I could not find any relevant reference. The closest I know of is the story described in the last paragraph here. I am reproducing it here for completeness:

“In 483 BC, a massive new seam of silver was found in the Athenian mines of Laurion. [1] Themistocles proposed that the silver should be used to build a new fleet of 200 triremes, while Aristides suggested it should instead be distributed among the Athenian citizens. [2] Themistocles avoided mentioning Persia, deeming that it was too distant a threat for the Athenians to act on, and instead focused their attention on Aegina. [1] At the time, Athens was embroiled in a long-running war with the Aeginetans, and building a fleet would allow the Athenians to finally defeat them at sea. [1] As a result, Themistocles’ motion was carried [out] easily, although only 100 triremes were to be built. [1] Aristides refused to countenance this; conversely Themistocles was not pleased that only 100 ships would be built.[30] Tension between the two camps built over the winter, so that the ostracism of 482 BC became a direct contest between Themistocles and Aristides [2] In what has been characterized as the first referendum, Aristides was ostracised, and Themistocles’ policies were endorsed. [2]”. Reference [1] is Chapter 4 of Plutarch’s volume on Themistocles. Reference [2] is pp. 219–222 in the book Persian Fire by Tom Holland.

Supposedly, using the money instead of giving it to the people is something the rich would probably be against.

As Contegeorgis mentioned, there are two works on the Athenian constitution which, confusingly, have the exact same title: Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία.

In (Pseudo-)Xenophon’s Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, Chapter 1, Sections 10 (Rachman’s translation): “Now among the slaves and metics at Athens there is the greatest uncontrolled wantonness; you can’t hit them there, and a slave will not stand aside for you. I shall point out why this is their native practice: if it were customary for a slave (or metic or freedman) to be struck by one who is free, you would often hit an Athenian citizen by mistake on the assumption that he was a slave. For the people there are no better dressed than the slaves and metics, nor are they any more handsome.”

The “χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες” (referred to using the Greek name even in non-Greek literature) means “those that did not live/inhabit” meaning, the slaves lived separately, not with their master. An interesting and very related article: Kazakévich, Emily & Kamen, Deborah. (2008). Were the χωρὶς οἰκοῦντες Slaves?. Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies. 48.

Contogeorgis probably refers to Pasion. Not only did he become very rich, but he was manumitted by his owners. Demosthenes tells us in Oration 36 (ὑπὲρ Φορμίωνος / For Phormio), Section 48: “ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι κἀκεῖνος ἦν τινῶν, εἶτʼ ἀπηλλάγη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ οὗτος ἀφʼ ὑμῶν, λαβέ μοι ταυτασὶ τὰς μαρτυρίας, ὡς ἐγένετο Πασίων Ἀρχεστράτου.” → “But in fact he too was of some [i.e., he belonged to certain men], and then was released in the very same way as this man was released by you; take for me these testimonies, showing that Pasion became of [i.e., belonged to] Archestratus.” See Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C by Davies for more information and secondary sources.

“ισάζειν” means “to equalize” (but can also be interpreted as “to be equal”). Unfortunately I could not find a quote. Note that Contogeorgis is referring to an era before democracy.

A somewhat relevant quote: In Politics, 1267a.38 Aristotle writes: “Having citizens possess equal amounts of property is somewhat beneficial in preventing discord among men; but, in a way, the benefit is hardly great [...] For there is no end to the nature of their desires [.] Accordingly, the starting-point of [curing] such [evils] is not so much to equalize property as it is to train men of an equitable nature to have no wish to demand more and to prevent bad men from getting more [.]”

Right after: “Phaleas did not speak well even about the equality of property, for he equalizes the possession of land only; but wealth may include also slaves and livestock and money, and also a great deal of what is called ‘furniture.’ So either all of them should be made equal, or some moderate arrangement of them should be made, or none of them should be regulated.”

“Fragmentation” is my attempt to translate “μοριοποίηση.” It comes from “μόριο” which can mean “piece,” “portion,” “part,” “member,” etc. “Μοριοποίηση” means to give something a form based on “μόρια.”

In Politics, 1282a.34: “It is not the individual juryman or councillor or member of the assembly in whom authority rests, but the court, the council and the people, while each of the individuals named (I mean the councillor, the members of assembly and the juryman) is a part of those bodies. Hence justly the multitude is sovereign in greater matters, for the popular assembly, the council and the jury-court are formed of a number of people, and also the assessed property of all these members collectively is more than that of the magistrates holding great offices individually or in small groups.”

1337a.28: “But matters of public interest ought to be under public supervision; at the same time also we ought not to think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the state, for each is a part of the state, and it is natural for the superintendence of the several parts to have regard to the superintendence of the whole.”

See comment at 02:29:12.

This is the famous argument in Politics, 1281a.40 - 1281b.7

See comment at 01:26:58 regarding Contogeorgis’ book.

This is probably an allusion to Rousseau’s volonté générale (general will).

In the subtitles, instead of translating the translated, I simply included the original. This is found in Chapter 2, Subsection: Public Opinion and Political Ideology, p. 31. This example is not their own. They cite Mueller, John. Policy and opinion in the Gulf War. University of Chicago Press, 1994, Ch. 2, p. 30

Rigas Velestinlis or Rigas Feraios was in the forefront of the Greek Enlightenment which led to the Revolution and the Independence. Contogeorgis has written a whole book on his conception of democracy, whose title I would translate as: “Rigas Velestinlis’ Greek Democracy.”

I am not aware of any relevant passage in which Aristotle addresses Alexander. But there is a famous passage with similar wording in Politics, in 1326b.1-8: "[A πόλις] consisting of too many, though self-sufficient [αὐτάρκες] in the mere necessities, will be [in a defective condition] in the way a nation is, and not a city, since it will not be easy for it to possess a πολιτεία; for who will command its over-swollen multitude in war? Or who will serve as its herald, unless he have the lungs of Stentor?" Stentor was a herald mentioned briefly in the Iliad known for his powerful voice.

The “ferace” is a Muslim garment, that (at least used to be) part of the traditional dress of women. In Greek the (now largely dated) idiom “X is the ferace of Y” is used to indicate that X is the way through which Y hides.

Already in a financial crisis, in 2010 Greece was bankrupt. In such a scenario, there are two options: (a) declare bankruptcy and go to courts with the creditors to figure out what it can pay off, (b) enter some economic adjustment programme with the creditors. Greece chose (b), leading to a series of such programmes, colloquially called “memoranda” (or memorandums). Many papers could be, and have been, written on the Greek financial crisis. I think two points are important to remember.

First, as far as reducing the debt of Greece, these programs failed miserably. In 2010 Greece had a debt of 127% of the GDP, and in 2020 it had a debt 181% of the GDP, even though it achieved surpluses in the meantime. But the program’s real goal was never to “save Greece,” as it was presented in Greek media, which brings us to the second point.

The program’s goal was simply to reduce the exposure of foreign private investors (e.g., foreign banks) to Greece. And in that, it was quite successful. See, for example, the sharp decline in Figure 3 of this Working Paper by the IMF: Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt. This is not a conspiracy theory of some sort. Apart from the earlier Figure 3, it is clearly articulated in this Working Paper by IMF: “Foreign banks began cutting exposure to high-spread euro area countries [like Greece] starting from early 2010 [...] Our estimates suggest that they started reducing their exposure to Greece in 2010Q1.” This debt that was unloaded by the private foreign investors was taken up by the IMF and other official institutions, to which Greece continued to owe money.

The term “Μεταπολίτευση” in Modern Greece refers to: (a) the short period from the fall of the junta in 1974 to the transition to “democracy”, or (b) to the whole period from the fall up until today. The jury is still out on which is the correct one. Contogeorgis used the second sense. The term comes from “μετα” (after) + “πολιτεύω.” The latter means to “govern, manage, direct politically, etc.” and thus a translation of “πολίτευσις” could be “regime.” Thus, technically the term “μεταπολίτευση” means “that which is after a regime,” i.e., a transition or change in the regime, and so technically its meaning is (a).

7:06 in this video. In particular, even though Greece was back then at 0.2% of the total world population, it accounted for 3% of the top scientists in the world.

This effect is magnified in the field of Databases. More specifically, here are some statistics I gathered. I counted the number of Greek reviewers in ICDE 2026. There are 51 Greeks among 409 members, or 13%. Interestingly, Greece’s population is 0.13% of the world population. In other words, there is around a 100× representation in database conferences.

Note something important: I have assumed the ontological premise that there is something called the true will. This was done to simplify the discussion, but obviously it is quite hard to specify what this “true” will is.

What I meant there was that in my understanding, the first step suggested by Contogeorgis towards including the society into politics, was to use polls with specific questions. A tool which, according to him, we could apply today. A discussion session is part of a subsequent step. Are we then to conclude that the discussion session is necessary?

The famous Mytilenean Debate appears in Book 3, Sections 36-49.

The implication being that I am translating this discussion.

The original is “ἄβυσσος ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις.” But there are related pronouncements in Ancient Greek texts, e.g., 1119b.8 in Aristotle, and 439D-... in The Republic by Plato.

(1) ἑταιρικὴ συντεχνία, (2) πολιτικὴ μισθοφορία. Note that I will be using the word “corporate” to translate “ἑταιρική,” even though the latter is much older. I am doing this so as not to overwhelm you with Greek words. More importantly, at 03:26:08, Contogeorgis seems to translate “συντεχνία” as “corporation.” But I do not think this is what he meant. He probably meant that the συντεχνία he describes is similar to what the West called corporation later. However, I do not use this term because the word “συντεχνία” in Modern Greek does not translate to corporation, and based on my research it did not translate to corporation in the Middle Ages either. This is why I translate it as “guild,” whose 2026 meaning, according to the dictionaries, agrees with one of the 2026 meanings of the word “συντεχνία.”

This book is only available in Greek (ISBN13: 9789600805246): Οικονομικά Συστήματα και Ελευθερία.

This refers to an example in Part 1, Chapter 2 of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. But there are some important differences in Weber’s example.

First of all, it was not Weber who increased the salary of employees. Second, according to Weber, the reason the employees (in this case farmers) worked less was not because they were eager to leave and go spend the more money they were now getting. In fact, basically the farmers were now making almost the same amount of money as before, but by working less. The explanation, according to Weber, is that people simply worked as much as they needed to in order to earn the amount of money that was necessary.

Thus, Contogeorgis seems to agree with what Weber says about the nature of humans (Stephen Kalberg’s translation): "People do not wish ‘by nature’ to earn more and more money. Instead, they wish simply to live, and to live as they have been accustomed and to earn as much as is required to do so."

I do not know if Hesiod ever said that. In fact, in his poem Works and Days, line 311, he writes: “ἔργον δʼ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τʼ ὄνειδος.” That is: “work is not a ὄνειδος [reproach, shame, disgrace], idleness is a ὄνειδος.” The whole poem argues that work is necessary and glorious. The word “ἀεργία” comes from the privative prefix “α-” (as in "a-typical") and “ἔργον” (work, labor).

Another common word for “work” is the word “δουλειά” (note the position of the stressing). The word “δουλεία” means “slavery.” The point Contogeorgis makes is that this is another indication that “work” has a negative connotation in the Greek language.

I translate “δουλεία” → “slavery” because Contogeorgis often uses the different forms of slavey as synonyms. However, one should remember that Contogeorgis is talking about slavery back then.

See previous comment. The same applies here. Contogeorgis used the word “δουλοπάροικος,” which technically is different from “δοῦλος” → “slave”—even though I think he means “slave”—so I chose to translate it as “serf,” although this is an anachronism.

Contogeorgis used two: (a) “αγωγή”, and (b) “μήνυση.” There are no exact equivalents in the English-speaking world, but here are some analogies. (a) is akin to filing a U.S. civil lawsuit. (b) is akin to criminal charges. In Greece such terms are a cause of a lot of confusion. For example, there is a fine difference between “μήνυση” and “έγκληση.” The latter means that the victim files the lawsuit, while the former means that someone else does it.

Contogeorgis used the word “αυτοκινητοβιομηχανία,” i.e., “the automotive βιομηχανία.” Now, the word “βιομηχανία” can be translated as: (a) industry, (b) factory, (c) company. (a) does not make sense as no person owns a whole industry, and (b) and (c) are not true for Agnelli. Contogeorgis meant that Agnelli was a principal shareholder of Fiat. Speaking of which, Fiat has had a certain affinity towards non-human workers since at least the 1970s, when it introduced robotization and it removed 65,000 jobs (out of a total of 165,000 or ~40%) in three years (Source: Postwar by Tony Judt, p. 459).

Regarding the translation “idleness,” see comment at 03:12:56 on the etymology of “αεργία.”

An obol (ὀβολός) was both a form currency and a measure of weight. Most famously, this appears in Lucian’s Νεκρικοὶ Διάλογοι (Dialogues of the Dead), in the dialogue Χάρωνος καὶ Μενίππου (Of Charon and Menippus). According to the mythology, the dead had to pay one obol to Charon, the Charon’s obol. Menippus had none, which is the setup of the dialogue. Menippus says the famous “οὐκ ἄν λάβοις παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος,” meaning, “you could not take from the one who does not have” (or usually terribly translated in English as “You can’t get blood out of a stone”).

“Τὸ καλῶς σχολάζειν εἶναι προϋπόθεσις τοῦ καλῶς ἄρχειν.” “Σχολάζειν” means to be in a state of “σχόλη.” “Ἄρχειν” is the infinitive that corresponds to “ἀρχή” (see Glossary of Untranslatable Terms). “Προϋπόθεσις” means precondition.” “Καλῶς” means “done well.” So, we could translate this as: “Το σχολάζειν well is a precondition to ἄρχειν well.” I could not find this exact quote in Aristotle’s works, but he makes this point many times. For example, Politics, 1273a.25: “it is not possible for a poor man to govern well—he has not leisure for his duties.” Or in Politics, 1273b.7: “it would at all events be better that he [i.e., the lawgiver] provide for their [i.e., those that hold office] leisure while in office.”

Contogeorgis used two words: “συντροφία” and “συντροφιά”. Note the position of the stress. Contogeorgis’ description (his manner of speaking, there is no other better way to describe it) implies that these two are related, and I would guess that he considers them synonyms. Note that the former is not used in Modern Greek while the latter is. Considering “συντροφιά,” in Modern Greek it translates to “company” but only in the sense of being with others. In other words, in Modern Greek we would never use the term “συντροφιά” to describe a commercial business. But as is probably apparent, in English one word has these seemingly unrelated meanings because in reality they are intimately related, as Contogeorgis explains.

See comment at 03:11:13.

Contogeorgis almost certainly refers to the book which he published in 1982 titled Κοινωνική δυναμική και Πολιτική αυτονομία, Τα ελληνικά κοινά της τουρκοκρατίας. Again, to the best of my knowledge, this has not been translated to English. Here is my translation of the title: Social dynamics and political autonomy: Greek commons in Ottoman Greece.

Kalymnos is a Greek island in the north-east of the Aegean Sea. It is known for its sponges and sponge divers. Note that sponges are mentioned both in Homer (Odyssey, Book 1.111) and Aristotle (many references in Historia animalium).

This is very close to Stageira, which is Aristotle’s home town. In Modern Greek texts Aristotle is commonly referred to as “Σταγειρίτης” (i.e., he who comes from Stagira), something which I have never seen in English texts. The tradition of referring to someone based on where they come from goes all the way back to Ancient Greeks. Thucydides’ Histories starts with “Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε …” i.e., “Thucydides the Athenian wrote …”

Skopje is a city in the north part of North Macedonia. So, it is not close to the tripoint of Greece, North Macedonia, and Bulgaria. However, in Greece many people use the name Skopje to refer to the country (i.e., what is now called North Macedonia).

Contogeorgis refers to his 6-volume work Το Ελληνικό Κοσμοσύστημα (my translation: The Greek Cosmosystem) which, to the best of my knowledge, is available only in Greek.

It is especially incredible if you consider that Foucault managed to unearth all kinds of unheard-of documents, but did not bother to look at the documents of Byzantium.

This is where translation becomes challenging. Contogeorgis uses the term “νόθο τέκνο,” which has been a contentious term in Greece. “Τέκνο” means “child” but “νόθο” has always had a negative/derogatory connotation (e.g., νοθευμένο ποτό → adulterated drink). The most natural translation is “illegitimate.” The term “νόθο” has been used to refer to children out of wedlock at least since Homer, who wrote in Iliad, Rhapsody Β, line 727 (my emphasis) “ἀλλὰ Μέδων κόσμησεν Ὀϊλῆος νόθος υἱός.” (illegitimate son). We can also find it in the New Testament, Hebrews 12:8. The term was abolished in Greek Law with Law 1329/1983 (so in 1983), and was replaced with “τέκνο γεννημένο εκτός γάμου” (child born out of wedlock). The same happened in the U.S., replacing “illegitimate child” with “child born out of wedlock.” But note that this happened in 1995, that is, 12 years after the change in Greece. In any case, however “incorrect” the terms “νόθο τέκνο” and “illegitimate child” may be, and despite the fact that what Contogeorgis describes here is progressive, I need to translate “νόθο τέκνο” as “illegitimate child” for the most accurate translation.

He is referring to the approach he has introduced, the Cosmosystemic Gnoseology. See the introduction.